Exploration The Property Rights System Reason Of State-owned Enterprises' Low Economic Efficiency

The reform of state-owned enterprise is always thecenter link of China's economic restructuring reform. Afterexperiencing a series of reform, such as releasing authorityand yielding the profit to the enterprises, carrying out thecontract system and the joint stock system reform, thestate-owned enterprise's vigor greatly strengthens comparedto more than 20 years ago, but the state-owned enterpriseeconomic efficiency was still low relatively.This article unifies the state-oWned enterprise reformpractice, and emphatically explains the state-ownedenterprise's low economic efficiency reasons frown theproperty right system angle. On the basis of discovering therelations between property rights and the enterprise'sefficiency, the article thinks the property rights ofstate-owned enterpriselimit unclearly thus produces external.For this reason, the frictions and barriers existed intransaction process can affect the behavior and the resourcesdisposition of enterprise, and influence enterprise'sefficiency. Meanwhile, the interior governance structure ofstate-owned enterprise is not perfect, lacks the effectiveincentive mechanism, and the operator morals risk is in flood.Those are also the reasons of the state-owned enterprise'slow economic efficiency. This article proposes that the key to improve thestate-owned enterprise economic efficiency is to constructthe effective property rights incentive mechanism. On thepremise of the clear property rights, by dividing the propertyrights and limiting the rights and interests between the ownerand user, it stipulates the right of the scarce resourcesdisposition. Thus it urges the economic subject effectively toutilize their property and to improve the economicefficiency.