| With increasing aging of the population, Chinese pension system is experiencing profound transformation, and is facing more and more pressure because it is far from perfect and widespread, so it's very meaningful to establish enterprise pension system aiming to relieve pressure and set up multi-outlet pension system. At present, Chinese pension system operates in trust management pattern and involves multi-agency in practice, resulting in converse selection and moral risk, which is the main research content in this paper.In preface part, the paper points out the practical meaning of establishment of enterprise pension system, and converse selection and moral risks existing in principal-agent relation . Also,referring to the related documents both from home and abroad, the paper further explains the significance, means and principles of this research. Then the paper elaborates the theory of principal-agent risk, in terms of its relative content and risk basic styles, which lays solid foundation on discussion in condition review, resulting reasons and tactics in following parts. As to the condition review, according to the development process and characteristics of trust management, the paper makes clear principal-agent relations in current enterprise pension system, and particularly illustrates its performance styles. In reason part, based on the general theory of principal-agent risk, the paper deeply analyzes the reasons leading to imperfect incentive mechanism and unhealthy constraint mechanism, which giving rise to principal-agent risk. In strategy part, based on preceding analysis, the paper finally put forward general pattern of incentive mechanism in principal-agent and effective incentive contract. Furthermore, in terms of law, information publication, index system of supervision and appraisal, market entry and exit mechanism and social agency organ, the paper elaborates the content of constraint and supervision mechanism. |
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