Study On Governmental Intervention Of The Market Equilibrium Through State-owned Reserve Of Grain Enterprises

This dissertation explores the topic of governmental intervention of the market equilibrium through certain state-owned enterprises. Such state-owned enterprises as the State Grain Reserve Corporation and the State Oil Reserve Corporation are entrusted with the dual responsibility of seeking profit maximization while intervening into the general market performance. But under the present mechanism design, such dual responsibility not only fails short of the expectation in profit seeking, but disturbs the general market, instead of stabilizing it, as well. The key factor of this failure lies in the unsound dual responsibility mechanism design. Conflict within the dual responsibility leaves a huge leak - when the market is lucrative, the enterprises tend to maximize their own welfare with the profit, and when the market-intervention effect is the goal to be assessed, they manage to execute the duty of market-intervention at enormous expense. The result is a costly-stabilized market or a losing company. To remedy such flaws, this dissertation proposes, under the guideline of accountability management, a new set of responsibility design, that is, first, to decompose the dual responsibility into concrete goals of market-intervening efficiency and cost-saving efficiency; and second, to execute the duty through open market operation instead of under-table operation between the state-owned enterprises and other enterprises; and third, to optimize the intervening pattern so as to buy when market supply is in obvious oversurplus and sell when market supply is in obvious shortage. Although derived only from the case...