A Study On The Reverse Operation Behavior Of State-owned Grain Enterprises

The state-owned grain enterprises are the micro foundation of the national macro-control of the grain market and they have been the core of the grain circulation system reform.The conflict between their dual goals which include operating and policy enable the enterprises to have a reverse operation tendency.However,this reverse operation behavior increases the risk of food market volatility to a certain extent.Researching on the internal mechanism of the state-owned grain enterprises' purchasing and buying behavior and discussing the incentive compatible mechanism with the government target has an important theoretical and practical significance to further deepen the reform of state-owned grain enterprises,to improvebusiness efficiency,to enhance the national macro-control,to stabilize the grain market and to improve the food security in China.Based on the current situation background of the state-owned grain enterprises' reform and development,the thesis analyzed the internal mechanism of state-owned grain enterprises reverse operation,then put forward hypotheses.On the basis,the thesis made use of spectrum analysis model to validate the hypothesis;and established incentive compatible mechanism between the enterprises' behavior and the government targets with aim to provide theoretical guidance for avoiding the enterprises' reverse operation.Finally summarized findings and proposed appropriate policy recommendations:The reform of the state-ownedgrain enterprisesfocus on economic benefits and ignoresocial benefits,which leads to the opportunistic behaviorof enterprises and unclear property rights,characteristics ofeconomicentity and the conflict between dual goals lead to a series reverse operation and the strong market power gives the enterprises ability to reverse operation.Between the acquisition of the grain and the grain purchase price index has cyclicalfluctuationphenomenon,so do the sales of grain and grain wholesale price index and they have a strongrelationship,but the relationship between the sales of the grain and the grain wholesale price index is stronger.What's more,due to the higher degree of thewholesale market,thereverse operation is stronger.Theoptimalincentive intensity hasa negative correlation with the state-owned grain enterprises' riskaversion coefficient,uncertaintiesvariance and cost coefficient,and hasa positive correlation with the enterprises' ability.