Research On The Compensation-incentive Mechanism Of China's Commercial Banks

Compensation system is one of the important parts of incentive mechanism in commercial banks. Reasonable compensation system can not only inspire the staff to work actively and positively struggle for the goal and raise the interests of the bank, but also attract and retain a group of competitive staff with high quality under the circumstances of hot competitions of human resources. With the globalization of finance, how to exert employees' enthusiasm furthest and construct a scientific, sound,efficient compensation-incentive mechanism of the commercial banks is greatly significant. Taking compensation-incentive mechanism in China's commercial banks as research object, the reasonable and backward aspects of this mechanism are found out by using contrastive and empirical analysis and furthermore the results drawn from this research might provide supportive proofs for the compensation reform in China's commercial bank.In this thesis firstly background and former researches are analyzed, and then concepts and some theories about compensation incentive are introduced, including hierarchy of needs theory, motivation-hygiene, equity theory, expectancy theory, team theory and principal-agent theory.In the second part, the status quo of the compensation-incentive mechanism in China's banks is analyzed. Based on the comparison on the compensation quantity and structure among state-owned banks, joint stock banks and foreign banks by means of sheets and charts, the thesis indicates the deficiency of the compensation-incentive mechanism in China's banks: the general compensation is still low; in the state-owned banks the disparity between operators and common employees is small; the compensation structure is single and there's no long term incentive method. These will go against the long-term development of China's banks.The third part is the empirical research. Then through date collection, variable and model design, the thesis does regression analysis on the effect of the commercial banks'compensation system. By discussing the demonstration result, it is found that the state-owned banks haven't set up an efficient incentive system which employees'compensation and bank performance are joined tightly. Instead, such system has been set up in joint stock banks.In the end the thesis sums up and tables a proposal on how to reform the...