| As a special area, the complex environmental characteristics, as well as the contradictory relationship with the district of basin cause contradictions and conflicts among the various stakeholders in the process of overall development and construction, and affect the coordinated development of the region. Therefore, it is of a certain practical significance to establish the corresponding watershed eco-compensation mechanism to allocate the ecological interests among the regions rationally through the ecological benefit of the reasonable compensation for the ecological builders, eco-saboteurs reasonable compensation to the losers.Based on a comprehensive comparison of watershed eco-compensation practice at home and abroad and combined with the features of our system and watershed environmental characteristics, this paper holds that there are only two kinds of feasible compensation models at the present stage in our country:the hierarchical model and the quasi-market model. The hierarchical model, which completely relies on the executive order from the government, though direct and simple for the ecosystem management in the large-scale basin, is inefficient when faced with the small basin governance issues. However, the quasi-market model, which is endowed with the characteristics of both government and market and overcomes the shortcomings both of the full government and the full market, is more effective in the settlement of inter-provincial and municipal small watershed eco-compensation issue. This paper chooses Minjiang River as the representative of small watershed, designs the quasi-market model of the basin, which includes the analysis of the game among the governments and the standard of compensation from the downstream residents to the upper reaches of Minjiang River, and finally offer some solutions to improve the watershed eco-compensation mechanism of quasi-market approach in terms of legislation, fund raising, capital use and regional economic cooperation. |
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