Analyzing The Effectiveness Of The System In The International Environment Cooperation

The environment benefit as the country's outside resource for surviving and developing has been very easy with the country's economy benefit to displace. Global environment problem has been given sensibility and vulnerability to very big degree. Power has affected system to some scale. the main body of a book intends to indicate that Whether the international environment system can boost the international environment cooperation depends on the degree of the mechanism accommodating to power and benefit and the dynamics characteristic of the up-level "forcible execution" which is distinguished.Part I is the premise which introducing the author's theory. The international environment cooperation because of the ultimate aim's non-competitiveness and the inferior ultimate aim's competitiveness has been become a commixture motivation game. the non-competitiveness and exclusiveness of environment common article has made the international environment cooperation no way to evade the "outside" effect, when country's proportion thumbing a lift reaches a certain degree ,then it have been caught in collective action difficult position . Starting off the individual reason has not been able to swear producing a collective spontaneous. The environment system bearing the function exporting organization pattern and resolving route builds responding to this need, but it only can make the relatively gauge being restraint by power difference and benefit compare. Whether can ascertain risk value , the surplus deciding to cooperate , being obeyed the appointment with the intensity maintaining becomes the measuring standard of the environment system efficacy, showing the depth of the cooperating among countries and the applying degree of the system and so on.Part II introduces the system's pattern, the system's arrangements and their efficacy presentation, and then concludes that system efficacy is limited in environment field. In environment field, sometimes,the developed countries proposing ,some leading factors of them initiating, and the developing countries participating put forth agreements ,regulations ,even grown up to organizations .Up to now, they have formed a certain system. The game harmony degree depends on the system efficacy mechanism, but that how to make the best use of the current international power structure first. Now, the states establish one kind of rank regimen contract pattern in order to maximize o converge the wishes of the states participating. international environment system validity is that many times game platform and steady expect has been provided, which brought forward a lot of organizations and resolving route towards comparatively broad environment topic. At the mean while, they have self problems rooting the current international system: outside the system, the in-cooperating actions existed broadly; inside hiatus sanction capacity lacked, despite of international society has carried out a lot of sustained effort ,gaining some ,the earth environment and nature resources continues to be degenerated with surprising rapidity.Part III analysis the causes of the system's limited efficacy form three facets ,which are power variation real,common benefit dilemma and sanction directing fear during the cooperation . International environment power variation in the cooperation is very obvious , presenting"USA dominating","north strong south weak"pattern. The power resource which the target interdependent asymmetry produces extends to environment field. This asymmetry makes developing country's function reduced, and it makes the current international environment field beard the pressure from USA leaded the dilemma. If cooperation is useful for USA, it will participate into the system, or it will withdraw, and the others are at the end of one's resources. The other pressure is from that the developed countries made the sex game dilemma. North-South intense relation leads to the international environment cooperate in a full of blockage. The developed country makes use of the position making policy ahead, ignore the developing country benefit deliberately, even in the name of instate tariff barrier to the developing country's trade. Weak country's "Self-insurance" and the system "cling to" attribution caused the system's sanction directing fear .The unbalance of the environment system efficacy between supplying and commanding, not having an effect to decide the cooperating surplus, makes the international environment cooperate get along with difficulty.Part IV brings forward the thought about the route that the system efficacy optimizes in international environment cooperation. Study about the in-cooperatation is to describe its law must work together superficially, but deeper target is in fact to seek road of cooperation. The international community's anarchic state of social production has given the country game sufficient space. International systems getting a resembling mature with economy parameter in the process of ceaseless haggling between the same supplying and demanding parties develop better and better. Although it is not even state which is in under-supply at present, but have bigger possibility to optimize. The country's force balance decides that whether the system efficacy mechanism could improve or not. Enlarging the participating portion of the developing countries outside the system is beneficial for the system's design inside .Basic tactics chooses have importance to obtain the degree of obeying appointments: increasing the capacity to restrain is more effective than increasing the obstacle violating them transgressing a treaty. At present, international community can realize a few improvements of the system efficacies by the routes which are selectively exciting and making environmental protecting cost outside into the system mainly.Finally, this part is my paper's conclusion. "The outside effect"makes the global environment problem evolve to become almost zero sum problems. although it's belong to the low politics category , the efficacy of system founded to resolve it is limited, and this finiteness roots in now available international pattern. even if the relevant country that has participated in an environment, it would distribute because the system can not state the certain benefit, and the system can not have an effect to resolve the collective action difficult problem as before. "Authority and benefit" are complementing with system each other sometimes; the system existence has its rationality. The system can drive the co-ordination to reach one kind of equilibrium between supplying and demanding by double system boosting benefit inside and outside, and then further the international environment cooperation.