| In the past few decades,the logic of "Land-Driven Development" has greatly promoted the rapid expansion of China’s economic scale.Local governments promoted regional economic to grow rapidly by providing industrial land easily.The concept of extensive development made policy makers pay more attention to the total growth rather than the efficiency of land allocation.As China’s economy has entered the new normal of medium-high growth rate,the penalties of extensive use of urban land has become increasingly prominent.There are obvious structural contradiction in the allocation of industrial land in cities,such as the coexistence of land shortage and land idleness.Especially in the economically developed eastern region,the further development of cities has been eliminated by the land constraints.In order to alleviate the inefficient use of urban land,Chinese governments at all levels have carried out a variety of reform experiments about the theme of "accelerating the market-oriented allocation of land factor".However,the existing literature on such reform experiments has not yet gone deep into cities.The reason is that the lack of land stock information of micro enterprises hinders the quantification of the allocation efficiency of construction land in cities.Therefore,researchers cannot accurately evaluate the actual effect of the land institution reform on the land allocation and furtherly judge the subsequent reforms.The measurement of the allocation efficiency of land Factors among enterprises in cities is necessary.Based on the fact that the efficiency of industrial land allocation in Chinese cities is low,this paper studies the efficiency of land allocation at the micro enterprises level.This paper uses the micro enterprises data of the National Tax Survey Database from2008 to 2015 to directly observe the land stock and TFP of enterprises,builds the factor allocation efficiency index at the city-industry level and city level.This study achieves the real-time observation and the horizontal comparison of factor allocation efficiency within cities.In particular,China’s land institution reform often has the procedural characteristics of "pilot,evaluation,and extension ",while this study can measure the real-time state of land allocation efficiency.It solves the defect that policy makers cannot directly observe the impact of reforms on the land allocation efficiency.On this basis,this paper explores the micro mechanism of the impact of three different reforms,which separately belongs to the approval management institution in the early stage,the land market institution in the middle stage and the stock utilization institution in the later stage,on the land allocation efficiency.This study supplements the relevant literatures on the transformation economies benefit from the land institution reform.Compared with the existing literatures,the following works have been done in this paper:(1)This paper systematically displays the land use characteristics of Chinese industrial enterprises for the first time.From 2008 to 2015.Cities in the eastern region gathered more than 50% of China’s industrial land,much higher than those in the central and western regions.However,from the perspective of land use efficiency,the unit gross industrial output value of urban industrial land in the eastern region stagnated or even declined after 2010.Specifically in the enterprise level,from 2008 to 2015,enterprises in eastern cities had relatively high average TFP,but their average land stock was significantly lower than those in other regions.It implies that low land allocation efficiency may be an important factor for the decline of land use efficiency in the eastern region,which suggests that economically developed regions are generally facing the development limitation of land shortage after experiencing the rapid development of construction land.With the continuous advancement of land institution reforms,in 2014,the efficiency level of urban land allocation in China showed a trend of gradual improvement on the whole.From the perspective of regions,the land allocation efficiency is worse in the developing regions and improved in developed regions.(2)On the approval management institution,which ocurs before the land elements enter the market,this paper studies the impact of the land approval decentralization institution reform on the efficiency of land allocation in cities,and puts forward the main mechanism that local governments can take their information advantages to improve the efficiency of local land allocation.The study found that the pilot policy of decentralization of land approval authority has generally improved the efficiency of land allocation and reduced the degree of land mismatch among enterprises in the cities.In the micro mechanism research,this paper finds that local governments have information advantages for local enterprises,and relatively reduce the land supply for enterprises with lower output per mu(a unit of surface area equals to 666.67 square meters),lower tax per mu,lower profitability and higher debt level.Furthermore,in the study of cities heterogeneity,this paper finds that in cities with large scale,high grade,low degree of marketization of land elements,high local financial pressure or low degree of corruption,the pilot policy of land approval decentralization has more significant mitigation effect on land mismatch.(3)On the land market institution,this paper studies the impact of the reform of the establishment of the administrative examination and approval center on the efficiency of land allocation in cities,and proposes the main mechanism that local governments can improve the efficiency of local land allocation by reducing transaction costs.This study finds that the establishment of the administrative examination and approval center,as an important institutional innovation to reduce transaction costs,has significantly improved the efficiency of land allocation among local enterprises.The analysis of heterogeneity shows that the positive effect of administrative examination and approval reform on improving the efficiency of land allocation is more obvious in cities with low degree of marketization,facing greater pressure of economic growth and greater pressure of promotion of municipal party secretaries.It shows that the establishment of the administrative examination and approval center alleviated the inefficient allocation of land caused by the low degree of marketization and the great pressure of economic growth,and the reform has brought marginal improvement to the efficiency of land allocation in these places.In addition,the mechanism analysis based on the micro enterprise data find that the establishment of the administrative examination and approval center lead the land resources to enterprises with high asset returns,non-state-owned enterprises,low leverage,high added value,large business income scale,and high tax payment,and these indicators have a certain correlation with the total factor productivity of enterprises.Therefore,the administrative examination and approval reform has effectively promoted the allocation of land resources to micro enterprises with higher production efficiency,thus promoting the overall improvement of land resource allocation efficiency.(4)On the stock utilization institution,which ocurs after the land is sold in the market,this paper studies the impact of the institutional innovation of the land utilization on the efficiency of land element allocation in cities,and proposes the main mechanism that local governments can improve the efficiency of local land allocation by reducing moral hazard and alleviating the friction in the secondary land market.This study found that,first of all,the reform has significantly reduced the mismatch of land elements among enterprises in cities of Zhejiang Province.The implementation of the policy has relatively increased the land stock of enterprises with higher operating income per mu and income tax per mu,and reduced the land stock of enterprises with lower added value per mu.Secondly,key industrial enterprises with higher average benefit per mu obtained more land stock,while non key industrial enterprises with lower average added value per mu undertook the largest decline in land stock.Finally,the implementation of policy alleviated the output mismatch among enterprises in the region,improved the per capita output of enterprises in the region,and brought at least8.368 billion yuan of added value to Zhejiang Province.This paper provides direct evidences for understanding the current state of land allocation efficiency in China’s cities,and provides ideas for further evaluation and design of land institution reform from the perspective of factor allocation.On a macro level,this paper shows the real level of industrial land allocation efficiency in various regions of China,which helps to observe the marginal change of industrial land allocation efficiency in various regions,and identify the net effect of the institution reform on allocation efficiency improvement.On the micro level,this paper displays the land stock information at the enterprise level for the first time,forms a detailed picture of the current situation of industrial land use by enterprises,calibrates the marginal return elasticity parameter of capital elements,alleviates the problem of missing variables of land elements in Solo residuals,and obtains an enterprise TFP close to unbiased estimation;In terms of mechanism,this paper identifies the driving factors to improve the efficiency of land allocation,uses the typical exogenous institution reform to tests the marginal change of land factor flow among enterprises,summarizes the micro mechanism of land institution reform to optimize land allocation efficiency,and supplements the relevant literatures on the transition economies benefits from land institution reform;In terms of results,this paper observes the net effects and economic consequences of land institution reform,providing theoretical support and empirical evidence for policymakers to determine the overall direction and specific arrangements of land institution reform.At present,the land institution reform of the central government focuses on establishing a unified urban and rural construction land market,while the institutional innovation of local governments generally focuses on matching land for efficient enterprises.There is an intersection between the optimal goals of the both.This study helps policymakers to achieve incentive compatibility between the central government and local governments as much as possible in the process of extending land institution reform. |
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