Research On The Low Level Of Endowment Insurance Collection And Payment For Urban Employees

As the aging problem is getting more serious,the pressure on the balance of income and expenditure of the basic endowment insurance for urban workers is increasing,and the financial sustainability of basic endowment insurance is also facing severe challenges.Consequently,the state has issued a series of policies on the collection of endowment insurance,as well as encouraging enterprises and individuals to make contributions,hence alleviating the financial pressure of endowment insurance.So far,the actual regional contribution rates are far lower than the nominal contribution rate.Based on incentive theories,this paper studies the low level of endowment insurance from the perspective of enterprises,governments and individuals,providing suggestions for further improving endowment insurance collection and establishing fair and sustainable social security system.Based on the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis,this paper obtains the following basic conclusions.First,the enterprises’ pension evasion has caused a loss of 33.9% of the theoretical payment amount.The evasion of enterprise endowment insurance has caused a deviation between the actual biological rate of return and the theoretical rate in the pay-as-you-go system.It shows that enterprise pension insurance evasion can be reduced to a certain extent by lowering the rate and the relative labor cost.Second,local governments have the incentives to weaken their efforts to collect pension insurance,hence reducing the actual level of pension insurance collection.On one side,under the multi-task incentive model,local governments’ competition for economic growth will form a “race to the bottom” in pension insurance collection,and hereby reducing the level of local pension insurance collection and payment.On the other side,although local governments bear the main responsibility of paying the pension in full and making up the gap of income and expenditure of the pension fund,due to the extensive social significance of social endowment insurance,the central government still can’t shirk its responsibility for it.Therefore,when the local government faces excessive pressure on the income and expenditure of the pension insurance,the central government will subsidize the local government.This will lead to a soft budget constraint on the main responsibility of the local government,which reduces the local government’s efforts on insurance collection,resulting in a low actual pension insurance contribution rate.Moreover,population mobility will further amplify these effects.Finally,whether individuals have incentives to participate in pension insurance will also affect the level of pension collection.Under a framework of political incentives,this paper finds that individuals usually delay their contribution when the make-up contribution policy was implemented,and increase their willingness to pay after the cancellation of the policy.To a certain extent,the paper adds to the literature on the low level of endowment insurance collection and payment.It estimates the degree of endowment insurance evasion relatively accurately,innovatively constructs the population flow matrix,and applies the incentive theory to the analysis of the endowment insurance collection.This study provides the theoretical basis and policy suggestions for the government to make the endowment insurance policy and improve the endowment insurance collection.Due to the unavailability of data,this paper neglects the linkage effect of government,enterprises,and individuals to some extent.The study has some limitations,but the analysis is generally reliable.Details of the study and its structure are as follows:Chapter 1 is the introduction.It mainly introduces the research background,research significance,literature review,research thoughts,research contents,research methodology,innovation,and deficiencies.Chapter 2 introduces the relevant concepts and theoretical foundations.It discusses the underlying reasons for the low level of Endowment Insurance collection from the perspective of the three groups,namely enterprises,governments,and individuals.That is,the behavior of enterprise endowment insurance evasion,the behavior of local government in bottom-up competition and soft budget constraint,as well as the incentive problem of low individual insurance contribution.Chapter 3 explains the low level of Endowment Insurance contribution status quo and its consequences.the actual collection rate of the current endowment insurance deviates from the nominal endowment insurance collection rate seriously,and the collection level of the endowment insurance is low.The above-mentioned problems will further increase the financial risk of pension insurance and widen the regional inequality.Combining the static multi-task incentive model and the dynamic budget soft-constraint model,chapter 4 analyzes the internal reasons of the low level of endowment insurance collection and the influence of the population flow on the government collection.In addition,the paper emphasizes that we can use the way we measure the incentive intensity of political officials,to analyze the impact of the change of individual incentive intensity on their participation of pension insurance.Chapter 5 estimates the degree of enterprise endowment insurance evasion,and empirically analyzes the influence of policy rate and relative labor cost on enterprise endowment insurance evasion.In Chapter 6,we use spatial econometrics and dynamic model to analyze the impact of local governments’ competition and soft budget constraint on the level of endowment insurance collection,and further empirically investigates the impact of cross-regional population mobility on the above issues.In Chapter 7,we use the age as the cut-off point to test the influence of incentive intensity on individual’s willingness to participate in basic endowment insurance.Finally,Chapter 8 are the conclusions and suggestions.Based on theoretical and empirical analysis,we summarize the basic conclusions,as well as providing some policy reference for further raising the level of endowment insurance collection.