The Problem And Its Research On Law-Based Governance Of "Kickbacks" Caused By Flexible Employment In The Manufacturing Industry

Taking the flexible employment labor market of the manufacturing industry in the Yangtze River Delta as an example,this study focuses on the internal order of the flexible employment labor market,and analyzes the games and interactions based on the labor legal system and social norms among the various market players,so as to understand the dilemma faced by China’s current labor legal system in the field of flexible employment.That is to say,the flexible employment labor market is embedded in the existing labor legal system in China,and the different behavioral logics presented by the employers,labour agencies and workers are analyzed.As labor resources are in increasingly short supply,it is the primary problem faced by labor service companies to make industrial workers adapt their own needs for works to the seasonal employment needs of manufacturing enterprises without breaching the existing labor laws.Therefore during the peak period of labor shortage,labor service companies strategically use "kickbacks" as an economic incentive to encourage professional intermediary agencies and employment scalpers to help them recruit workers,and also to attract workers to cooperate with them.Specifically,the labor service companies can flexibly adjust the amount of "kickbacks" according to the shortage of workers,so as to influence the employment willingness of the workers,and adjust the actual effective period of the signed labor contracts by controlling the time limits for working in each factory in order to obtain "kickbacks".By the implementation of these measures,the labor service companies can indirectly control the flow of laborers and realize the flexible allocation of labor resources,whereby the labor market is characterized by high efficiency,low legitimacy,strong control and low social security.It is found that the "kickbacks game" is an important mechanism to realize flexible employment,and it is also the source of the "domination-obedience" relationship in the labor market and factory system.The "kickbacks game" has improved the efficiency of resource allocation in the labor market,but it has also caused the failure of the formal labor market and the damages to the workers’ rights.The main consequences of this practice are as follows.First,the information barriers caused by the intervention of labor agencies such as intermediary agencies and employment scalpers have caused disorder in the flexible employment labor market of manufacturing industry and destroyed the employment environment in the labor market.Under the malicious competition of labor agencies,the amount of "kickbacks" has been continuously raised.This not only breeds a profit-seeking class around "kickbacks",but also leads to the failure of the formal labor market and the increasing labor costs of manufacturing enterprises,which together bring adverse effects on the benign development of China’s manufacturing economy.Second,although it seems that the "kickbacks game" has released the contradiction regarding the distribution of interests between the workers and factories,but in fact it reconstructs the labor value system and shapes a more unequal relationship among powers.Labor service companies have created a flexible mobility of workers through the "kickbacks game",which aggravates the problem of insufficient employment in the labor market,and also makes the capital control over labor extend from the goods production process to the labor market even before the establishment of labor relationships.By extending the control of capital from labor process to labor force,flexible employment breaks the traditional labor relationships,and also makes the distribution of labor and capital benefits externalized.Because of the interest-seeking actions of the labor agencies,which is the profit-seeking class,the workers often fail to obtain their expected "kickbacks".In addition,the "kickbacks game" has intensified the flow of labor forces,which makes it impossible for the workers’ vocational skills to be improved,and further exacerbates the shortage of skilled workers,which leads to the realistic contradiction between supply and demand in the labor market.Objectively,the development of Internet technology makes the informal social network norms in the labor market decline.At the same time,however,the allocation of resources in the labor market has not changed according to the logic of law.The institutional root of this paradox lies in the failure of the law,the price mechanism and social norms in the control of the flexible employment labor market.First,there is a tension between the single adjustment mode of China’s labor relationship legal system and the need for flexible employment.Flexible employment makes employment methods more diversified,which makes a distinction between the current labor relationships and the traditional ones.It also presents the characteristics of atypia and externalization,which cannot be effectively regulated by existing legal mechanisms.Second,while the formal legal system doesn’t work effectively,the high mobility of the flexible employment market makes it difficult for the social norms to play their role,too.Third,due to the lack of corresponding punishment mechanism,the labor "contracts" can not effectively regulate the labor relationships,while the information asymmetry and imperfect competitions also lead to the efficiency loss of the market price mechanism.The commercialization degree of the labor force is constantly intensified in the disorderly competition,and the labor laws inclined to protect the workers are put asideTherefore,it is urgent to solve the problems as to why the labor laws are distorted,how to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and how to build China into a world manufacturing power.Solutions to these problems can be summarized as follows.First,we should change the "single adjustment" mode of labor laws,regulate different types of employment methods in different ways,appropriately expand the scope of adjustment of the labor laws,and strengthen the protection for the rights and interests of workers in flexible employments.The second is to effectively supervise the third-party groups involved in the labor relationships by means of multiple governance,such as perfecting the existing laws and regulations regarding private labour agencies,and giving play to the leading role of public employment agencies.Third,we should integrate the employment service systems and strengthen the construction of an Internet public employment service platform.Fourth,it is significant to improve the skills of workers by ways like vocational training and vocational education to help them make more rational decisions in the process of job hunting.To sum up,based on the survey of the micro practice of the labor market in the manufacturing industry,this thesis regards the legal relationship of labor as a dynamic relationship chain,and tries to explain the practice mechanism of flexible employment from the perspective of social sciences of law.The transformation of this research perspective and the presentation of new viewpoints constitute the innovation of this thesis.This thesis holds that the labor relationships are not only static legal relationships,but also dynamic social processes.With the development of this kind of social process,a variety of legal relationships may arise and even gray areas beyond the regulation of laws will appear,too.Therefore,the protection of the benign developmental environment for the manufacturing industry and the protection of workers’ rights and interests should not be limited to the duration of labor relationships.We should also strengthen the supervision and governance of the flow of labor before the establishment of labor relationships.This is what must be done to promote the development of China’s manufacturing industry and protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers.