| Collective forest plays an important role in China’s forest resources,and the design of its property rights system is directly related to the sustainable growth of forest resources and the sustainable development of farmers.Since the founding of People’s Republic of China,the collective forest property right system has undergone several changes.Regarding the relationship between forest farmers and collectives,it has continuously adjusted between "divided and unified" and "released and collected".The variability of ownership leads to the long-term problems of unclear property rights,poor resource quality and low productivity in collective forests.In order to solve the above problems,China launched a new round of collective forest tenure reform in 2003 with "clarifying property rights and contracting to households" as its main content,and has continued to improve the reform so far.As a far-reaching,costly and evolving reform,how to change and influence the division and evolution of collective forest property rights?Has its reform goal of "resource growth,farmers increase income" been achieved? These questions need to be answered through the combing of property rights structure changes and the evaluation of reform performance.The proportion of collective forest land in Yunnan Province is very high,and the development of forestry is of great significance for poverty alleviation in mountainous areas.However,Yunnan Province is also a key ecological functional area designated by the state.Under the dual goal of protection and development,the changing characteristics and influence of collective forest rights are worthy of attention.First of all,this study builds a theoretical analysis framework that affects reform performance with the help of institutional theory,property rights theory,and transaction cost theory.Second,by describing the resource characteristics and institutional environment characteristics of the new round of collective forest tenure reform in Yunnan Province,analyzing the selection logic of the reform plan,and refining the collectives formed after the reform from the perspective of subdivision between different rights bundles forest property rights structure.Third,through descriptive statistical analysis,outline the status quo of the new round of collective forest tenure reform performance.Fourth,the production function is used to introduce the right to use,income,and disposal as exogenous variables into the production function,build a system of simultaneous equations between the property rights structure and factor inputs,factor inputs and outputs,empirically test the collective forest product structure and intensity adjustment on the collective forest land management performance of farmers,so as to determine whether the reform goal of "increasing farmers’ income" has been achieved.Fifth,following the logic of "change of forest land utilization mode will inevitably bring about changes in forest resource sage situation",with the help of DID model,empirically test the impact of change severity of collective forest property rights on the performance of farmers’ management forest resources,so as to judge whether the reform goal of "resource growth" is achieved.Finally,combined with the results of the above-mentioned performance test,from the perspective of the internal structure of the power bundle,thinking about improving the performance of the reform of "separation of powers" in forest land through organizational innovation.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)The launch of a new round of collective forest tenure reform in Yunnan Province is more unified with the reform will of the central government and has the characteristics of active institutional change.The design choice of the reform plan is fair and preferred,which is beneficial to the mountain farmers to obtain the means of production equally,but the resulting forest land fragmentation also makes the forestry industry development face the high transaction cost of the efficiency loss.(2)The new round of reform has effectively realized the separation of collective forest land ownership and contract management rights,and extended the right to use forest land,the right of income and the right to dispose of it by the right of contract management.The right to use forest land is guaranteed by the right of confirmation and the right of income through tax reduction and fee reduction,but the realization of the right to dispose is different from the goal set by the reform.Because the forestry department is not steadfast in maintaining the benign change of forest resources through individual management,it overemphasizes the ecological protection function of collective forests,but lacks market-oriented means of realizing ecological values,making the power boundary of disposal rights appear jagged changes and affect property transferability.(3)The property rights structure formed by the new round of collective forest tenure reform has a differentiated effect on the allocation of forestry elements of farmers.The stability of the right of use reduces the cost of property rights protection,and through substitution effects,labor and capital factor inputs can be transferred to economic activities that generate higher returns.The expansion of the right of income and the right of disposal have positive influence on the allocation of labor and capital elements,of which the influence of disposal right has statistical significance.However,due to the personality of forest land property characteristics and the resulting resource endowment effect,coupled with the high transaction cost caused by the fragmentation of forest land,the confirmation of rights does not promote the circulation of forest land elements.(4)The increase of property right intensity has a positive but not significant impact on Farmers’ forestry income in general,among which the increase of disposal right has the greatest impact on income growth,and the statistics is significant.Since the boundary of power between the right to use and the right of income has been stabilized and can no longer be expanded,the focus of further deepening reform must be the release of the right to dispose.However,the urbanization process leads to non-farm employment,which reduces the importance of forestry income,and is also an important reason why property rights have little effect on forestry income.(5)The improvement of property right intensity has a positive impact on the resource performance of farmers’ forest land.Compared with the public welfare forest,the property right intensity of commodity forest land is higher,and the increase of accumulation and depression in the study period is more obvious than that of public welfare forest land.Stable and transactional property rights give farmers the opportunity to make cross-term decisions in accordance with the principle of maximizing benefits,prolonging logging cycles and increasing forest management,which is beneficial to the sustainable use of resources.(6)The personified property characteristics of forestland and the high transaction cost caused by endowment effect are the main factors hindering the performance improvement of the reform.It is the guarantee to improve the performance of the reform by the separation of ownership rights;contractors’ rights and land management rights.it is more important to further subdivide the management rights,in order to make ‘small and complete’ farmers coming into the division of the economy.Replacing economies of woodland scale with Economies of services scale will improve the performance of reform. |
