Research On Desertification Control Mode Based On Differential Game

In recent decades,the excessive economic activities of mankind have led to a serious increase in desertification on the earth’s surface,which has aroused widespread attention to this problem,especially in developing countries.Desertification not only makes the people in the sandy areas live in deep waters,but also affects the ecological environment quality of adjacent downwind areas,even non-desertification areas thousands of kilometers away,resulting in serious economic losses.In addition,because land is a non-renewable resource,large-scale desertification will lead to a large-scale reduction of the available arable land,which directly affects the problem of food and clothing of human beings.Some desertification countries have suffered severe famines and a large number of people have been displaced.Therefore,desertification is not only an ecological environmental problem but also a socio-economic problem,controlling land desertification has become a problem to be solved urgently.Desertification control is a large-scale ecological control project,which usually requires huge investment,long treatment time and the firm beliefs as well as strong financial support of the governance subjects.Consequently,in early desertification control,the governance subject is usually the government.In the process of desertification control,the Chinese government has constantly explored and sought better ways to control desertification,found that the introduction of social capital to participate in desertification control can achieve better governance results.On the one hand,enterprise participation in governance can alleviate the financial pressure of the government.On the other hand,it can drive the people in sandy areas out of poverty.With the development of desertification control in recent years,more and more enterprises see that desertification control can obtain considerable benefits,so their willingness to participate in desertification control is gradually strengthened.In the process of desertification control evolution in recent 30 years,enterprises have gradually become one of the governance subjects that can’t be ignored.It can be seen that both government and enterprises play an important role in the process of desertification control in China.As the main subjects of desertification control,the optimal mode of government and enterprises participating in desertification control has aroused our attention.Considering the dynamic changes of desertification control and the long-term characteristics of the control cycle,we study the optimal desertification control mode between government and government,government and enterprise,enterprise and enterprise based on differential game theory.The core chapters of this paper are Chapters 3to Chapters 6,the specific contents can be entended as:Chapter 3 considers the differences in economic development level and governance technology level between adjacent regions,a differential game model of desertification control at a certain cooperation level led by one side is constructed.Then,the optimal desertification control investment level of the two governments,the governance scale and revenues of both sides in a certain cooperation level control mode,cost sharing mode and technology transfer mode are studied.It is found that the adjacent areas adjust the revenue distribution proportion of desertification control according to the governance mode is conductive to improve desertification control scale.When the cooperation level dominated by the region with high level of economy and governance technology is lower,the technology transfer mode is the optimal mode,but when the cooperation level is higher,the cost sharing mode is the optimal mode.It is further found that improving the cooperation level of the leading region can improve its desertification control investment level in the three modes,but only in the cost sharing mode,can improve the desertification control investment level of the non-leading region.In technology transfer mode,improving cooperation level can’t promote the investment level of non-leading region.At this time,the improvement of non-leading region’s investment level is caused by the improvement of governance technology.Chapter 4 considers the dual dynamic changes of desertification control scale and enterprise goodwill,constructing differential game models to study the game problems of jointly controlling desertification between government and enterprises in non cooperative mode,cooperative mode and government ecological subsidy mode.The results show that the choice of governance mode will not affect the optimal pricing of desert characteristic products.The effect of desertification control between government and enterprises in cooperative mode is the best,followed by the government ecological subsidy mode,and the effect of non cooperative mode is the worst.The government’s reduction of tax rate does not always can encourage enterprises to increase desertification control investment level.Only adjust the tax rate according to the choice of governance mode can promote enterprises to improve desertification control investment level more effectively.Considering the uncertainty of the specific revenues of the players in cooperative mode,a revenue distribution mechanism that can promote the stable cooperation between the two sides is proposed.Chapter 5 considers the two enterprises that competed in the sandy industry and with different desertification control technology levels,in different governance technology authorization modes,we constructed differential game models to studied the optimal product pricing,the optimal desertification control investment level,the governance scale and revenues of both sides.It is found that the optimal pricing of desert characteristic products operated by the two enterprises and the desertification control investment level of the technology licensor are not affected by the technology authorization mode.In the non technology authorization mode,the revenues of the two enterprises are at the lowest level.In the license fee authorization mode,the licensee’s desertification control investment level and governance scale are improved,the revenues of the two enterprises are also improved,and the revenue growth rate of the licensee is greater than that of the licensor.In the fixed fee authorization mode,both the licensee’s desertification control investment level and governance scale,and revenues of the two enterprises are the highest,and at this time,the desertification governance scales of the two enterprises are the same.Chapter 6 pointed at enterprises that produce and operate in the same space and have certain mutual positive externalities,differential game models are constructed to study and analyze the optimal control investment level,desertification governance scale and revenues changes of the two enterprises in no cost sharing mode,unilateral cost sharing mode and bilateral cost sharing mode.It is found that the governance effect of bilateral cost sharing mode is the best,unilateral cost sharing mode is the second,and the governance effect of no cost sharing mode is the worst.The total revenue of the two enterprises in the bilateral cost sharing mode is higher than that under the unilateral cost sharing mode and no cost sharing mode.The externalities generated by the two enterprises can promote desertification control scale improving,and the promoting effect is the strongest in the bilateral cost sharing mode.Therefore,the two enterprises can achieve a win-win situation by reaching the bilateral cost sharing mode.For the case of bilateral cost sharing mode can’t be implemented automatically,we provide a dynamic revenue distribution mechanism.