Study On Dynamic Reduction Game Based On Multi-agent Network

Climate change is one of the most serious environmental risks of the twentyfirst century.Irreversible and abrupt climate change will lead to increasing temperatures and changing rainfall patterns over the next century,significantly affecting human livelihood,increasing the risk of disaster and resulting in a stateless conducent to human development.Climate change is a result of rising greenhouse gas emissions,by which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change.Therefore,measures to mitigate risk must focus on reducing greenhouse gases in the context of development efforts.In the real world,greenhouse gas governance and climate cooperation involve multiple actors.The status and role of each participant in the governance process are different.Therefore,it is necessary to establish a network game model.The adoption of the network can provide a new method and perspective for the assessment of greenhouse gas control issues to understand its process and structure.This paper uses network game as a tool and bounded rational analysis as the theoretical basis to study the formation mechanism of international climate cooperation,the emission reduction behaviors of member states,and the evolution of the cost function of greenhouse gases.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)Based on complete rationality,two multi-agent--mitigation networks are constructed according to the impacts of technology and capital on promoting international mitigation of climate change.Each real-world country is seen as an agent of the network.A relationship between any two agents,which can be either a technology or capital transfer,is seen as an edge of the network.The model reveals the necessary functions and mechanisms of technology and capital for establishing an international mitigation union.The main work is to find the agent's optimal emission paths in two network by using optimal control theory such that agent's discounted stream of net costs is minimized.Results show that the optimal reduction policy in technology network is higher than that in capital network and the total subsidies are smaller than the latter.That is,technology transfers are a very effective means of controlling pollution,whereas capital transfers are not.(2)On the basis of the above work,we discussed the impact of three kinds of bounded rationality on international climate cooperation.And found that: for the response delay model,the developed country's optimal prices trajectory has the following structure: the price is low when the number of bounded countries is less than a certain level and is high when the number is greater than the target.We also show that a certain number of bounded rational developing countries is conducive to the success of emission trading.For the short-sighted model,when some of the developing countries are myopic,the optimal reduction policy is much lower than that in the case where all of the developing countries are farsighted.The level of pollution is much higher for the former case than for the latter one.However,for the developed country,the presence of a certain number of myopic developing countries can maximize its objective function.Finally,we found the critical condition for a farsighted developing country to adopt a myopic framework.For the model with we analyse the complex dynamic phenomena of the optimal solution and discuss the influence of the parameters(e.g.,the neighbors (4)))on the complex nonlinear dynamic behavior of the optimal solution.Furthermore,we conclude that under the same conditions,the bifurcation phenomenon is more likely to occur in the capital-based network.(3)The principal-agent model is used to make an empirical analysis of the information incomplete model.Taking green building as the research target,the cause of incomplete information and its influence on the production process are discussed.By introducing "spot check mechanism",the optimal green fund transfer strategy is obtained.The results suggest that manufacturers do not deceive the public as long as the transfers are in the right form.