Coal Mine Safety Management Under The Constraint Of Limited Rationality

Economic development cannot be achieved without the support of energy.By the end of 2017,China's coal consumption accounted for 60.4% of the total energy consumption,indicating that coal is still the mainstay of China's current and future economic and social development.With the strong supervision of the government at all levels on the production safety of the coal industry in China,the hardware conditions for the safety production of coal mining enterprises have been constantly improved,which has also promoted the change of the management focus from the visible and tangible safety environment to the visible and intangible people,and the traditional management concept of coal mines has been greatly challenged.Most accidents in coal mines are caused by the unsafe behaviors of miners,and among the various factors leading to the unsafe behaviors of miners,emotions play a dominant role due to their characteristics of being relatively hidden and easily interfering with the judgment of miners' behaviors.Previous studies on coal mine safety management were mostly based on expected utility and paid less attention to people's subjective perception.Combined with the cumulative prospect theory and emotional event theory,this paper divides miners into emotion-driven and judgment-driven types,and takes people's subjective perception into consideration.An evolutionary game model is established between coal enterprises and miners,and between miners and miners in the face of negative leadership emotions.By solving and analyzing the model,it is found that:(1)the behavior choice of miners is affected by the objective organizational environment such as organizational atmosphere and organizational culture.Only when the objective influence of the negative emotions of leaders on miners is small enough,can the safety performance of all miners be improved;The greater the deviation of miners' subjective cognition of the objective environment,the worse the improvement of safety performance.(2)regulatory costs of coal enterprise and emotional behavior of the driven men change cost respectively smaller than a certain value,the system can achieve the highest safety degree,but because of the easy to overestimate the cost of two kinds of this kind of situation in reality it is difficult to achieve,at the same time,the current salary incentive mechanism of a coal mine in pingdingshan as an example,the construction of salary incentive for emotional type of miners' behavior choice model,analyzing compensation change on the influence of the behavior selection;...