Study On The Multi-task Relationship Between Production And Safety And Safety Incentive Mechanism In Coal Enterprises

Coal is the main energy to support China’s economic development,accounting for more than60% of China’s energy consumption at present.As the main body of the industry,the state-owned coal enterprises are faced with the multi-task contradiction between production and safety under the dual assessment system from the government of profit indicators and safety indicators.The coal output and safety objectives of coal enterprises need to be achieved through the labor input of workers,in order to balance the production and safety input of workers,and to deal with the limited liability of workers’ safety behavior at the same time,it is necessary to analyze the current situation of safety incentive system comprehensively and deeply,find out the essence of game relationship between managers and workers around the tasks of production and safety,and clarify the mechanism of the safety incentive system.Finally,according to the conclusion of theoretical analysis,the enterprise application method to improve the efficiency of safety incentive is excavated.The basic theory of this research is the principal-agent theory.This study adopts three research methods: system contrast analysis,theoretical research and theoretical modeling,empirical analysis.In this dissertation,three problems are studied: the multi-task relationship between production and safety in coal enterprises,the incentive problem under the limited liability of workers’ safety behavior,and the optimization of safety incentive system in coal enterprises based on multi-task goals.This study promotes and develops the safety incentive theory system which conforms to the production and safety characteristics of China’s coal enterprises.This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between coal production and safety in China by using the cross-section data of coal enterprises and the time series of coal industry transition period.At the same time,it makes a systematic and comprehensive analysis on the implementation status and optimization measures of safety incentive system in coal enterprises from the perspectives of overall framework and system details.The main research contributions include:1.This study constructs and analyzes the multi-task agent model about the characteristics of the relationship between production and safety in coal enterprises.-----Under the condition of the double examination objectives of profit and safety,which are carried out by the government to the managers of state-owned coal enterprises,a multi-task principal-agent model and the situational analysis are set up on the mechanism of how workers make decisions on production input and safety input through according to the workers’ wage contracts formulated by the manager.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)Coal price,coal productivity of workers and incentive intensity of profit to managers have negative effects on coal mine safety,while safety productivity of workers and incentive intensity of safety to managers have positive effects on coal safety.(2)Coal price,worker’s coal productivity and worker’s safety productivity have no influence on the safety incentive intensity in the worker’s wage contract;the production profit and the safety incentive intensities of the manager have negative and positive effects on workers’ safety incentive level respectively.2.This dissertation constructs and analyzes a theoretical model about the limited liability problem of employee safety behavior in the coal production process.-----According to the present situation of limited liability and incomplete information of workers’ safety behavior in the coal production process,a principal-agent model of limited liability for coal mine safety behavior is established,and the equilibrium results of various behavior information and limited liability scenario are compared and analyzed.The conclusion of the model shows that:(1)the limited liability of worker’s safety behavior increases the incentive cost of the enterprise;(2)the safety reward and penalty intensity set by the enterprise should be positively related to the worker’s production income;(3)the limit of safety responsibility must satisfy the premise of the worker’s participation;(4)The perfection of the safty foundation increases the cost of enterprise safety incentive.3.Empirical studies on the relationship between production and safety in coal enterprises are carried out,including static and dynamic empirical research.The static empirical research is based on the census data of 61 key state-owned coal enterprises,taking the coal mine safety index as the explained variable,the coal price,the coal mine production index,the coal mine safety index and so on as the explanatory variable.The production and safety econometric model of coal mine is established,which provides empirical verification for the reasoning of multi-task agent model of production and safety.The static model results show that:(1)coal price and coal productivity have a negative impact on coal mine safety,safety technology has a positive impact on coal mine safety;(2)safety production has scale effect,coal mine production scale increases safety level accordingly.The dynamic empirical study is based on the time series data of safety index and output index of coal industry from 2009 to 2016,and establishes the dynamic econometric model of coal production and safety,using Granger causality test,impulse response,variance decomposition and other methods.the dynamic relationship between the output and safety of our coal industry after China energy entering the New Normal period is analyzed,which improves the empirical analysis of China’s coal mine safety in the period of industry transition.The dynamic model results show that:(1)coal production is the Granger cause of safety level in this period;(2)the increase of coal output will make the safety level rise rapidly in the short term,but the long-term impact tends to be zero;(3)the impact of coal production on the safety level accounts for about 10-30% of the overall fluctuations.4.Application Research on salary framework and safety incentive system based on the relationship between production and safety in coal enterprises is carried out.With the help of investigation data of twelve coal mines of a large state-owned energy group,a frame analysis of the existing salary system of coal enterprise is carried out.Meanwhile the detail analysis of two kinds of coal mine internal safety incentive systems(the security structure salary system,the security risk mortgage fund system)have carried on,related to the implementation post scope,the examination target,the reward and punishment dynamics and so on.Finally,according to the overall characteristics and distribution differences of the coal mine safety incentive system in China,combined with the theoretical model conclusions,the proposed optimization suggestions in the scope of posts,assessment indicators and rewards and penalties and other aspects are proposed.