Transboundary River Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism Based On Public Participation And Gradual Negotiation

Due to the inconsistency between the natural and administrative boundaries,the transboundary management of the ecological environment of the river basin has become increasingly difficult.Due to the public goods attribute and one-way mobility of water resources,the rational thinking of various stakeholders based on their own interests often falls into the "prisoner's dilemma",and it is difficult to achieve common interests through collective action.Transboundary river basin water resources governance is a long-term project that costs a lot of money and has a slower effect,and it is difficult to be effectively solved by a certain governance behavior of a local government alone.At present,there are still some problems in transboundary ecological compensation in China,such as the choice dilemma of market and government channels,the difficulty in defining the subject and object of compensation,the difficulty in unifying the compensation standards and methods,and the lack of public participation,which make it difficult to reach a consensus on the cooperation of transboundary ecological compensation in a large scale,multi-level and long period.This paper constructs the transboundary river basin ecological compensation mechanism based on public participation and gradual negotiation,explores the path to integrate public participation into the government-led watershed ecological compensation,and considers the public willingness and preference in the design of key issues of compensation policy.This paper constructs a research framework of transboundary watershed ecological compensation based on public participation and gradual negotiation,defines the subject and object of ecological compensation,and discusses the gaming behavior of upstream and downstream local governments and the public participation in compensation behavior of the watershed.Based on the cost-benefit of the improvement of river basin ecosystem services and negotiated by local governments,we put forward the method of compensation standards.And we put forward the design and optimization of ecological compensation mode,which includes public willingness and preference.Taking the Wei River Basin as an example,combined with 1159 survey data of residents in the basin,using empirical analysis methods such as choice experiment,Rubinstein bargaining model,double hurdle model,multivariate Probit model,etc.,to explore the influencing factors of public participation in compensation behavior in the Wei River Basin,calculate the river basin ecological compensation standards,and discuss the public's preference for transboundary ecological compensation mode and influencing factors.Finally,on the basis of the above research,a transboundary river basin ecological compensation mechanism and countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing ecological compensation policies are constructed.Based on the above systematic and theoretical research,the main conclusions and dicussions are as follows:Firstly,compensation policy based on public participation can represent the benefit of the whole basin,broaden the channels of compensation funds,and improve the matching degree between the compensation policy and the public demand.Gradual negotiation between the upstream and downstream local governments can solve the problems of complex relationship and difficult definition of stakeholders in transboundary river basin ecological compensation,and make it easier to implement and operate.Public participation provides reference and basis for gradual negotiation,and gradual negotiation is the representative of public willingness and preferences.The subject of transboundary watershed ecological compensation is the area benefiting from ecosystem services,and the subject of compensation is the area providing ecosystem services.The static game between the upstream and downstream local governments found that there is a dilemma of ecological compensation and ecological environmental protection between the upstream and downstream of the river basin;the evolutionary game analysis showed that the introduction of the constraint mechanism of the superior regulatory authorities made the upstream and downstream local governments evolve in the direction of(protection,compensation)for a long time.Secondly,the decision-making process of public participation behavior in the lower reaches of the river basin includes two different stages: willingness to participate and degree of participation,and the influence mechanism and internal logic behind them are quite different.Taking Wei River Basin as an example,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of psychological ownership on public participation behavior from the perspective of social psychology.The public's psychological ownership is divided into three dimensions:self-efficacy,responsibility and identity.The willingness to participate mainly depends on the public's judgment of their own ability and their sense of environmental responsibility and values,and the degree of participation depends more on the public's judgment and grasp of self-governance ability.The long-term "government-led environmental governance" mode in China has led to the formation of a more serious government dependent psychology among the public.Promoting the accumulation of trust capital,by strengthening the downstream public's sense of self-efficacy in their judgment and perception of their own governance capabilities,and internalizing their environmental values into personal norms for protection behavior,are of great significance for promoting effective public participation in transboundary watershed ecological compensation.Thirdly,based on the cost principle,the total cost of supply of ecosystem services in the upper reaches of the Wei River Basin is estimated to be 142.53 million yuan per year,which is the lower limit of the compensation standard.Then choice experiment is used to quantify the benefits of ecosystem services to downstream users.If the governance behavior of the upper reaches of the basin makes all the evaluation indicators reach the optimal state designed in this paper,then urban residents are willing to pay 1107.86 yuan per household every year on average for the next 10 years,which is higher than the 981.44 yuan per household of rural residents.Further calculation shows that the income of ecosystem service improvement in Wei River Basin of Shaanxi Province is 2529.1296 million yuan,which is the upper limit of ecological compensation standard.When the upstream and downstream negotiate according to the cost and benefit of ecosystem service improvement,due to the "advantage of patience" and "first-mover advantage" in the negotiation process,the downstream provinces are in a relatively favorable position in the negotiation process,and finally obtain a larger share of net benefit.At this time,the amount of compensation is closer to the minimum standard calculated by the cost principle.In a more realistic finite-term bargaining game,the share of net benefit depends on the negotiation period and who bids in the final stage.This is the "backward advantage" in the bargaining game.Although the downstream has the "first-mover advantage" of proposing the distribution plan first,the weak upstream can still use the "backward advantage " of the final proposal to strive for more benefits.Fourthly,based on the preference of compensation ways and influencing factors of the compensation subjects in the upper reaches of the Wei River Basin,results shows that there is a substitution effect between the financial compensation and physical compensation,technical compensation;there is a complementary effect between technical compensation and project compensation.Male are more likely to choose physical compensation,while female are more likely to choose technical and project compensation;The older the watershed residents are,the more likely they are to choose the technical,project and other hematopoietic ecological compensation methods;The lower the education level,the more likely they are to choose the blood transfusion compensation.The geographical distance from the family's place of residence to the watershed significantly negatively affects the residents' choice of financial compensation,but it has no significant effect on phsyical compensation,technical compensation and project compensation.When the degree of risk preference is higher,they are more likely to choose the project compensation ways.When they are more trust the government,they are more likely to choose phsyical compensation,but the less likely they are to choose project compensation.Last but not least,based on public participation and gradual negotiation,this paper constructs a transboundary river basin ecological compensation mechanism in China,and puts forward relevant suggestions on the design and optimization of transboundary river basin ecological compensation policies,so as to provide valuable theoretical basis and scientific support for solving the dilemma of ecological compensation in China.