Political courage: A test case for the eudaimonism of Aristotelian moral virtue

This work examines the subject of Aristotelian moral virtue and its conduciveness to human happiness. I focus on the particular virtue of courage, as I address a series of theoretical challenges to the link between courage and eudaimonia: the problem of the seemingly self-sacrificial character of nobility that requires one to risk one's life for the sake of the city; the apparent tension between the performance of courageous acts and pleasure, the latter of which Aristotle insists is a key component of happiness; the ambiguous function of reason within moral virtue, where the former seems to subvert the self-subsistence of moral action; and the Aristotelian presentation of the contemplative life as a potent rival to the happiness that morality---and therefore courage---claims to promote. The dissertation ultimately argues that Aristotelian courage is not only consistent with happiness---with a uniquely human kind of happiness---but it is also necessary for it.