THE ANGLO-GERMAN INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA, 1902-03

The coercive phase of the Anglo-German intervention against Venezuela lasted from December, 1902, to February, 1903. With the assistance of Italy, these two powers blockaded the Venezuelan coastline and seized Venezuelan warships in order to force Caracas to answer claims against her for maltreatment of foreign nationals and shipping, for mishandling of civil war claims, and for default on the foreign debt. In the stages of the intervention, after the sinking of Venezuelan gunboats and shelling of its forts, negotiations were held in Washington between the American Minister to Caracas (on Venezuela's behalf) and allied negotiators. After repeated attempts to induce President Roosevelt to arbitrate the issue, the negotiators finally signed protocols ending the intervention, but referring the issue of the priority of allied claims over the claims of non-blockading powers to The Hague International Court.;The Venezuelan Affair stirred a massive outcry in the Anglo-American press against the coalition, condemning Germany for its warlike conduct against Venezuela, its veiled assault on the Monroe Doctrine, and its attempt at estranging Anglo-American relations. The British government came under fire, at home and abroad, for its incompetence in entering the coalition and its supposed subservience to German policy. The hostile public opinion distorted the diplomatic process, and whatever advantage gained on claims against Venezuela was counter-balanced by a worsening of Anglo-German relations.;This study approaches the topic from three views. At one level, it is a demonstration of the impact of the personality and character of diplomats, as opposed to rational calculations of national interest, on the course of diplomacy. At its broadest level, it is a study of the penetration of public opinion into foreign affairs and its disruption of the rational limits of diplomacy. At the intermediate level of Anglo-German relations, both these effects were felt. The net result is not a conclusive explanation for the widening gap between Britain and Germany during the early twentieth century, but a suggestion of the emotional microcosm that favored such an estrangement. As such, this study reflects the Anglo-German tensions that made not only the Venezuelan Affair, but the course of Anglo-German relations in general, a "mess".