Not a particularly different voice: The jurisprudence of Sandra Day O'Connor

This dissertation is a study in American legal thought and judicial behavior. This work analyzes O'Connor's written Supreme Court opinions, her voting record on the Court, her off-the-bench writings and speeches, transcripts from interviews which she has granted, the transcript of her confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, and the written record of her service in Arizona state politics and government.;A five point typology is claimed to represent the themes which have consistently characterized Justice O'Connor's written Court opinions. This typology, which forms the outline of O'Connor's judicial "value system," is substantiated through a detailed examination of dozens of her written opinions (drawn from a variety of legal contexts), with many more of these opinions referred to as secondary sources of evidence.;The components of this value system include (1) an essentially conservative or restrained approach to judging (what I have called her marginalist jurisprudence); (2) a strong sense of what she believes to be the "proper" role of the Court, and of courts and judges in general, especially as regards the idea of judicial restraint; (3) a belief in the primacy of positive law, legal tradition, and established governmental practice, as opposed to a belief in fundamental, nontextual individual rights or natural law ideals; (4) a strong sense of deference to governmental action and so-called compelling governmental interests, including a willingness to uphold a wide latitude of discretion on the part of administrative agencies; and (5) a very strong belief in both the paramount importance and the utility of a careful and consistent method of statutory interpretation.;O'Connor's decisionmaking exhibits a narrowly-conceived emphasis on proceduralism, an ostensibly strong belief in precedent, a states' rights-based respect for the legal diversity throughout the various state judiciaries, and an overall avoidance of questions regarding substantive justice or fundamental rights. In sum, O'Connor adheres to a strongly conservative approach to judging, apparently believing that law should reflect, rather than compell, social, governmental, and economic change.