The Hallstein Doctrine: West Germany's global campaign to isolate East Germany, 1949--1969

This dissertation is the first archivally based study of West Germany's efforts to deny international recognition to East Germany. Using a combination of threats and financial incentives, leaders in Bonn persuaded non-communist states to avoid dealings with the regime in East Berlin. Bonn's isolation campaign, dubbed the 'Hallstein Doctrine' after an unpopular foreign ministry official, became one of the foremost preoccupations of West German diplomacy. The policy worked on many levels: as a means to enhance the Federal Republic's international status; as a contribution to the overall Cold War strategy of the Western alliance; and as a program for keeping the German Question open. In contrast to most earlier assessments, the author has found that the Hallstein Doctrine effectively advanced these goals until the late 1960s---though it did not bring German unification any closer.; Using newly available German, French, and American sources, this dissertation explores the history of the Hallstein Doctrine as a series of improvised decisions. Bonn's relations with virtually the entire non-aligned world come under consideration here, with special attention to Finland and Yugoslavia; Ghana, Guinea, and Tanzania; Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; and India, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia. West Germany compelled these countries to cooperate by issuing a straightforward threat: it would break diplomatic relations with any country that established relations with East Germany. This acted as a powerful deterrent, particularly after Yugoslavia invited retaliation by crossing the line in 1957. Over time, the Federal Republic also transformed its development aid into a tool of the Hallstein Doctrine. However, this device occasionally backfired, for certain countries---notably Egypt and Indonesia---flirted with East Germany in order to attract more Western aid. On balance, though, the greatest costs of the Hallstein Doctrine were political, not financial: to avoid complications, cabinets in Bonn delayed the establishment of relations with Israel and with Eastern Europe for more than a decade. This generated intense criticism at the time; yet this dissertation argues, based on a close reading of contemporary public discussions, that the Hallstein Doctrine's practitioners and critics agreed on the basic assumptions and values underlying the policy.