| Philosophers of science such as Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have employed evolutionary idiom in describing scientific change. In Science as a Process (1988) Hull makes evolutionary theory explanatorily applicable. He modifies key evolutionary terms in order that both biological evolution and scientific change are instances of a general selection process.; According to Hull, because of naturally-existing competition for credit among researchers and the professional lineages they constitute, scientists are constrained to cooperate and collaborate. This process entails two important philosophical consequences. First, it allows for a natural justification of why the sciences can provide objective empirical knowledge. Second, appreciating its strength means that a philosophical analysis of scientific change is solidly difficult features to combine.; I work on strengthening two weaknesses in Hull's arguments. First, operating in his analysis is an unexplicated notion of “information” running parallel to the equally opaque notion of genetic information. My third chapter provides a clear account of “genetic information” whose usefulness extends beyond the assistance it can render Hull as a clear concept is needed in biological contexts as well.; The fourth and fifth chapters submit evidence of scientific change from radio astronomy. Hull insists on empirical backing for philosophical theses but his own book stands to suffer from selection effects as it offers cases drawn from a single subspecialty in the biological sciences. I found that in the main scientists and the change they propel accords well with Hull's explanation. However, instances of major change reveal credit- and resource-sharing to a degree contrary with what Hull would expect. My conclusion is that the naturalness of competition, instantiated during the course of standardized and relatively “normal” scientific research, is not the norm during periods of new research and its uncertain standards of protocol. As such my position is an inversion of the relationship Hull views between cooperation and competition in scientific change. Cooperation is a precondition for competition, rather than the other way around. |
