| It is clear that luck can contribute to morally significant consequences and states of affairs. The problem of moral luck is the apparent conflict between the intuitively plausible idea that a person should not be morally assessed based on the luck she experiences, and commonplace violations of this principle. Many examples have been put forth as illustrating the problem of moral luck, and yet the literature has only focused on a narrow set of issues that the examples raise. In the dissertation I conduct a systematic analysis of the problem of moral luck, and through analyzing a broader range of cases, it becomes clear that there is not necessarily a single problem of (or solution to) moral luck.;In the first chapter I step back to consider the concept of luck in general and in reviewing the widely received account of luck, I make the claim that significance and probability are not independent but are interacting components of luck. In chapter two, taking Nagel's and Williams' examples as paradigms, I distinguish moral luck from ordinary luck, and the different ways one can be affected by luck. I challenge the notion that what we should aim for is a unified theory in which all kinds or instances of moral luck have similar implications for moral assessments. I also demonstrate that some philosophers articulate the problem and discuss examples of moral luck in such a way that certain issues are automatically featured, while other significant issues are left untreated. In chapter three I address the control condition, explain why it is underspecified, and offer a refined version of the condition that better accounts for the complex relations between control and blameworthiness. In chapter four I analyze what is wrong with the solutions to the problem of moral luck offered by "moral luck critics" and show that the crux of the disagreement among philosophers lies in whether the condition of control is accepted as a first principle. |
