| The notion that the bureaucracy is relatively unresponsive to its political principals carries with it several assumptions: (1) civil servants' political and policy preferences are different from the preferences of their political superiors (2) civil servants follow standard operating procedures and are attentive to their clientele, which may differ from the goals and procedures the president desires and (3) bureaucrats have the capability to sabotage (or seriously hinder) initiatives on the political agenda if they are not strictly controlled by the political level. This research questions those assumptions. Specifically, through case studies in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations that offer a "tough test" of bureaucratic responsiveness, this study finds that civil servants' professional ethics and standards are more important than their political preferences in terms of inducing responsive behavior to political superiors. It concludes that the employment of an administrative presidency strategy is less effective at eliciting policy responsiveness than a management strategy that openly involves civil servants in decision making. |
