The development of turbojet aircraft in Germany, Britain, and the United States: A multi-national comparison of aeronautical engineering, 1935--1946

In the 1930s aeronautical engineering needed revision. A presumptive anomaly was envisaged as piston-engine aircraft flew higher and faster. Radical alternatives to piston engines were considered in the unending quest for speed.;Concurrently, but unwittingly, two turbojet engine programs were undertaken in Europe. The air-breathing three-stage turbojet engine was based on previous turbine technology; the revolutionary idea was the gas turbine as a prime mover for aircraft.;In Germany, Dr. Hans von Ohain was the first to complete a flight-worthy turbojet engine for aircraft. Installed in a Heinkel designed aircraft, the Germans began the jet age on 27 August 1939. The Germans led throughout the war and were the first to produce jet aircraft for combat operations. The principal limiting factor for the German jet program was a lack of reliable engines. The continuing myths that Hitler orders, too little fuel, or too few pilots hindered the program are false.;In England, Frank Whittle, without substantial support, but with dogged determination, also developed a turbojet engine. The British came second in the jet race when the Whittle engine powered the Gloster Pioneer on 15 May 1941. The Whittle-Gloster relationship continued and produced the only Allied combat jet aircraft during the war, the Meteor, which was confined to Home Defense in Britain.;The American turbojet program was built directly from the Whittle engine. General Electric copied the Whittle designs and Bell Aircraft was contracted to build the first American jet plane. The Americans began the jet age on 1 October 1942 with a lackluster performance from their first jet, the Airacomet. But the Americans forged ahead, and had numerous engine and airframe programs in development by the end of the war.;But, the Germans did it right and did it first. Partly because of a predisposition towards excellent engineering and physics, partly out of necessity, the Germans were able to produce combat turbojet aircraft during the war. The Allies lagged from a lack of necessity, operational incompatibility, and stringent acceptance requirements. By the end of the war the Germans needed qualitative technological superiority to combat an overwhelming Allied quantitative advantage.