| The purpose of this research is to examine the mechanism and function of urban growth control in Beijing and to evaluate its effectiveness and consequence utilizing empirical data on land use change. In order to achieve this goal, I combine quantitative research methodologies, including spatial analysis and spatial modeling, and qualitative research methodologies, such as institutional analysis. This study examines the total amount, and spatial pattern, of urban growth in Beijing during the study period, and compares that to the urban growth boundaries defined in comprehensive plans. The results indicate that urban growth in Beijing has been out of control during the study period, despite the great efforts made in the comprehensive planning practices that attempted to regulate land use change, and to control the speed of urban growth in Beijing.; This study finds that there are various factors contributing to the unbridled urban growth in Beijing. Models of policy factors, such as the distance to the urban growth boundary, which represent a force of control, shows that they play a role in preventing chaotic land use changes. However, they are not strong enough to curb undesired urban growth, or even create incentives and opportunities for such growth. Models of spatial factors, which represent a force of development, shows that profitability is a critical factor contributing to illegal land use transfer.; Institutional analysis shows that the rapidly changing socio-economic environment and the inertia of the political system are responsible for Beijing's ineffective urban planning system and unmanageable urban growth. The divorce of plan-making from plan implementation, the distorted institutional system under transition, the undemocratic political regime, the lack of strong laws, the unbridled state power, and the power asymmetry within the state apparatus have greatly challenged the authority of the urban planning system. Specifically, the reform of China's land market has opened up lucrative arbitrage opportunities of transferring land from either the urban plan track of free administrative allocation, or the rural collective sector onto the market track, for high-value commercial developments. Local government and state agencies at various levels have mobilized themselves to engage in massive land conversion and development in Beijing. Their vested interests in the potential profits are from land conversion and transaction.; This study indicates that the hope for successful development control in Beijing lies in a deep reform in the urban planning system and urban land markets. However, such reform is not just a policy, legislative, or technical issue. It calls for far-reaching political reform and constitutional transition. |
