| This dissertation contains three chapters analyzing competition among broadcast radio stations, focusing on the impact of station ownership changes from the Telecommunications Act of 1996.;Chapter 1 provides empirical support for the well-known theoretical phenomenon that competing stations will over-provide the most popular formats relative to that which maximizes listening. This occurs because stations seek to maximize their own listeners, obtained both by attracting new listeners and by "stealing" listeners from other stations. An "over provided" format means too many stations are present, and listening increases less at the margin because stations are mostly stealing listeners from each other. Simulations indicate repositioning 16% of stations could increase total listening 13%. To the extent jointly owned stations internalize the business stealing effect, this chapter supports relaxing ownership restrictions.;Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between common ownership and format choice. Results indicate that duplicative programming is more prevalent in mid-sized markets. This supports the existence of entry-deterring behavior because deterrence is unnecessary in small (large) markets where entry is unattractive (unavoidable). Thus, firms may have an incentive to duplicate programming to "stake out" their respective dominant areas in programming space.;Chapter 3 shows that higher station ownership concentration following the Telecom Act increased advertising revenues 4.8% to 6%, or about ;Overall, the dissertation provides a mixed message. On one hand, higher concentration may increase programming appeal to a broader audience, and possibly provide greater value to advertisers. Alternatively, adverse effects arise through the potential for market power over advertisers, and the potential for duplicative programming to dominate demographic groups. Given the ambiguity in which effects dominate, it seems premature to make major changes to current ownership rules without further understanding. |
