| This dissertation examines how the complex institutional structure of the European Union (EU) influences the member states' ability to secure favorable negotiation outcomes and shapes their behavior during the legislative decision-making negotiations. In the first chapter, I examine the role member states' voting and proposal powers play in helping them secure larger shares of funding from the EU budget. I argue and show that the proposal-making power associated with the EU Presidency plays an important role in determining the cross-state allocation of the budget. In the second chapter, I examine the extent to which member states succeed in influencing day-to-day decision-making in the EU. I argue that member states' potential to form powerful coalitions with like-minded members who care about the negotiated legislation, which I term their coalition potential, is essential to explaining their ability to secure policy outcomes that reflect their preferences. I empirically illustrate the important role member states' coalition potential plays in bringing about successful instances of legislative bargaining. In the final chapter, I explore the extent to which the member states move away from or compromise their initial policy positions during policy negotiations and the reasons why they do so. |
