Research On The Imbalance Between Supply And Demand Of Farmer Household Loan Guarantee In Jilin Province

At present,the demand for the production and living funds of farmers in our country is increasing,and the loan becomes the most direct way for farmers to solve the problem of insufficient funds.In the case of information asymmetry between financial institutions and farmers,the adverse selection and moral hazard of farmers will increase the risk of default of farmers’ loans.Therefore,credit rationing,as a long-term equilibrium phenomenon,has been prominent in farmer household loans.In order to reduce the loan risk and the losses of farmers’ loan defaults,financial institutions often need the loan guarantee for the farmers when they give credit to farmers.Loan guarantee has become an important factor in the success of loan financing for farmers.At present,the current situation of the rural credit guarantee market in China is that the imbalance between the supply of effective loan guarantees provided by financial institutions and guarantee institutions to farmers and the demand for loan guarantee of the farmers is becoming more and more serious.The imbalance between supply and demand of farmers’ loan guarantee market has seriously affected the availability of farmers’ loans,which will lead to the distortion of rural financial resources allocation;it is not conducive to the development of rural economy and the improvement of farmers’ living standard.This dissertation starts with the demand and supply of loan guarantee for farmers.Based on the loan guarantee market for farmers in Jilin Province,it takes the main body of farmer loan guarantee market in Jilin province as the research object to analyze the reality of farmers’ loan guarantee demand and supply,summarizes the basic characteristics of demand and supply,and demonstrates the main manifestations and causes of the imbalance between supply and demand of farmers’ loan guarantee.It analyzes the significant factors affecting the demand and supply of farmers’ loan guarantee,measures and evaluates the operation efficiency of the sample farmer loan guarantee institution,analyzes the behavior of the government in the farmer loan guarantee market through the empirical analysis.For government,banking financial institutions,guarantee institutions,farmers and other farmers’ loan guarantee market participants,we put forward some targeted decisions to solve the imbalance between supply and demand of farmers’ loan guarantee market in Jilin province.The main contents and conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:Firstly,the analysis of the supply and demand of loan guarantee for farmers in Jilin province.Based on the survey data and field visit data of 840 households in 19 counties and 42 townships in 6 cities in the eastern,central and western parts of Jilin Province,we summarize the basic characteristics,demand satisfaction and loan guarantee loans of Jilin farmers’ loan guarantee demand.Through the field interviews with the agricultural bank of China in Jilin province,Jilin bank,rural credit cooperatives,rural commercial bank,fund mutual assistance society and other banking financial institutions and relevant government departments,we analyze the government’s loan guarantee policy on Farmers’ loans,the quantity of loan guarantees and the supply factors of the varieties in the banking financial institutions.And the system changes of the loan guarantee of farmers in Jilin province are combed.We find that the operation mechanism of farmers’ loan guarantee is not smooth,the guarantor who can provide the third party guarantee for the farmers is missing and weak and farmers have no effective guarantee assets,which are the practical problems in the supply and demand of farmers’ loan guarantee.Secondly,the analysis of the restrictive factors of the supply and demand imbalance of farmer household loan guarantee.On the basis of defining the meaning and measurement index of the unbalance of farmer household loan guarantee,the restrictive factors of the supply side and the demand side of the farmer household loan guarantee are analyzed.The Logit model is used to analyze the factors affecting the demand and supply of farmers’ loan guarantee,and the significant factors are selected.It is found that 7 factors,such as household population and the number of household labor have a significant impact on the effective demand for loan guarantee;9 factors,such as the land area of farmers’ families and the agricultural productive income of farmers’ families,have a significant impact on the effective supply of loan guarantee for farmers.At the same time,when financial institutions are found to provide loan guarantees to farmers,no matter what kind of loan guarantee,even the way of credit guarantee depends on the fixed factors related to the farmer’s assets,such as the land area of the household.That means that farmers with less mortgaged assets are difficult to obtain all types of loan guarantees.In addition,the research also found that the rate of farmers’ guarantee is fast or slow,which has a great impact on the supply of guarantee supply to the financial institutions and guarantee institutions of the banking industry.Thirdly,analysis on the operation efficiency of farmer household loan guarantee of third party guarantee institution in Jilin province.Using data envelopment analysis(DEA)to compare the national average,we analyze the operation efficiency of farmer household loan guarantee operation of 38 samples and third party guarantee institutions in 15 counties and cities in Jilin province.The analysis results show that,in general,the technical efficiency of the loan guarantee operation of the sample guarantee institutions in Jilin province can reach the national average level,but the pure technical efficiency is relatively low.The comprehensive technical efficiency of the farmer household loan guarantee operation of the policy guarantee institution is high,and the pure technical efficiency and the scale efficiency are relatively balanced.The pure technical efficiency of the loan guarantee operation of the commercial guarantee institution is relatively low,but the scale efficiency is high.The scale efficiency of the loan guarantee of the mutual aid guarantee institution is low,but the pure technical efficiency is high.According to the analysis of the operation efficiency of guaranty institutions,the commercial guarantee institutions should improve the management level and technical level of farmers’ loan guarantee business.Mutual guarantee institutions should increase the scale of the loan guarantee business of farmers.Because the operation efficiency of the policy guarantee institutions is high and relatively balanced,the government should increase financial support and support the policy guarantee institutions to provide more loan guarantees to farmers.Fourthly,the analysis of government behavior in the supply of loan guarantee for farmers.From the angle of welfare economics and institutional economics,we analyze the behavior mode of government intervening in the peasant household loan guarantee market.Through the rural credit market and the guarantee market failure,and farmers’ loan guarantees have quasi public goods attributes,we can conclude that the government has the necessity to intervene in the farmers’ loan guarantee market.Through game analysis of government and guarantee institutions,we can draw the conclusion that government must regulate and intervene in the effective border of farmers’ loan guarantee market and avoid competition in the field of farmers’ loan guarantee market belonging to private goods and commercial guarantee.A reasonable way for the government to intervene in the farmers’ loan guarantee market is to establish and support the policy guarantee institutions and provide them with more effective farmers’ loan guarantee supply as agents and encourage the innovation of the rights pledge farmers’ guarantee products in the guarantee products.The innovation point of this dissertation:On the restrictive factors of the supply of loan guarantee for farmers.1.We find that the rate of cash change of farmers’ collateral has become an important factor that restricts the effective supply of loan guarantee for farmers.If we can’t change the problem of slow realization of mortgage assets or pledge rights and low realization efficiency,it will have very limited practical significance to expand the scope of farmers’ collateral or develop more new guarantee products,so that the supply of farmers’ loan guarantees cannot be effectively improved.2.When a financial institution or a guaranty institution provides a loan guarantee to a farmer,no matter what guarantee is adopted in the real life,it depends on the size of the family’s land and the amount of family assets.The pledge of rights is created in order to solve the problem that farmers can guarantee too little assets.It includes "land management right mortgage guarantee","land income right guarantee","grain direct supplement guarantee" and other new guarantee products.In the end,the supply and supply still depends on the land property rights of the farmers,which means that small scale farmers with less assets and land are hard to get any existing form of loan guarantee.