Research On The Participants’ Behavior Of Credit Mutual Aid In Farmers’ Professional Cooperatives

There has always been a dilemma of "difficult financing,difficult loaning,and expensive financing" in the process of rural revitalizing.It is urgent to carry out supply-side reform in the rural financial market to promote the innovation and development of the rural financial system.Agricultural economics in China features household operation and mutual aid,but the imperfect cooperation and operation mechanism in agricultural finance field leads to the consistence between agricultural financial organization system and economic development.In order to solve the above problems,some local government voluntarily and spontaneously carried out the mutual fund mutual assistance business within the farmer’s cooperative,which,to some extent,help to satisfy the demand of the member farmers,but also caused such problems as non-standard,illegal operation,the illegal storage of the loan,the cooperative managers running away with the fund etc.In order to standardize the cooperative fund mutual assistance activities,reduce the operation risk and explore the effective mode of rural credit cooperation,the pilot project of farmers’ professional cooperative credit mutual assistance business has been carried out in Shandong Province.The pilot project has made some achievement through the stage of “start-up,promotion and improvement”,but there are also some problems.For example,introduction of the system design of cooperative trusteeship banks has weakened the enthusiasm of cooperatives and farmers to participate,and reduced the activity and scale of credit mutual assistance business.At the same time,because of the lack of corresponding incentives,cooperative escrow banks are not active enough to participate in the trust of mutual credit funds.Why is the effect of credit mutual aid unsatisfactory despite its benefits for development of agricultural economy and support from central and local government? How to improve the system design to promote its safe and effective development? This paper will answer these questions by giving some ideas and suggestions through analysis of behaviors of the participants.Therefore,this paper has great theoretical and practical significance for promoting the sustainable development of credit assistance of farmers’ cooperatives and deepening the reform of new rural cooperative finance.This paper is problem-oriented.Based on the investigation on the pilot project in Shandong,reviewing theories of rural finance,institutional change,planned behavior,and evolutionary game theory,combining theoretical study and empirical study with literature review,questionnaire,and model analysis,and clarifying such concepts as credit mutual aid,participants,and willingness of participation,this dissertation identified theparticipants of credit mutual assistance,analyzed the behavioral characteristics of each participant,constructed a three-party game model to analyze the behavioral game relationship in the two-tiered regulatory system of “financial supervision department—cooperative custodian bank-cooperative”,constructed evolutionary game model to conduct evolutionary game and simulation of behavioral strategies of "cooperative custody banks-cooperatives-members farmers",analyzed the the evolution of the system influenced by the initial intention of the three parties.Then the structural equation model and the binary logistic regression model were constructed to verify the willingness of members to participate in credit mutual assistance and its mechanism of action.The key factors affecting the participation behavior of members are analyzed,and the countermeasures and suggestions to promote the sustainable development of credit mutual assistance were proposed.The flowing findings are achieved:First,analysis of the evolution of agricultural finance based on system evolution theory shows that the institutional change from internal fund mutual assistance to credit mutual aid is a process of inductive system evolution It’s suggested that in the supervision of credit mutual aid,excessive government intervention should be avoided to prevent the alienation of the nature of cooperation..Second,the evolutionary game model analysis shows that the financial supervision department and the cooperative custodian bank constitute a two-tier supervision system for cooperatives.Whether their regulatory objectives are consistent or not has a significant impact on the cooperative’s behavioral choices and the development of mutual credit.When the regulatory objectives of the two are inconsistent,the supervision from the cooperative custodian bank will be weakened,which contributes to the violations of cooperatives objectively.Increasing incentives for cooperative custodian banks can stimulate their enthusiasm;but the different percentages of fines will affect the role of supervision and guidance of cooperative custodian banks.Farmers’ professional cooperatives are more sensitive to economic penalties,so raising the standards for violations and increasing the intensity of censorship by financial regulatory authorities can effectively reduce the occurrence of cooperative violations.Simulation shows that the impact on system evolution from the initial willingness to participate of cooperative custodian banks,cooperatives and members of cooperatives is more remarkable,compared with adopting different regulatory measures.Therefore,efforts should be made to foster a healthy credit cooperation environment.As far as policy regulation tools are concerned,in different initial states,granting subsidies to cooperatives,granting subsidies to members,and punishing illegaloperating cooperatives have their own advantages and disadvantages,requiring financial regulatory authorities and cooperative custodian banks to continuously improve their capabilities to adjust policy measures timely to changes in the status of mutual credit aid development.Third,based on the improved theory of planned behavior,a comprehensive effect model was constructed from members’ subjective perception perspective including perceptual usefulness,perceived convenience,perceived cost,and willingness to participate in credit mutual assistance and perceived satisfaction.The analysis found that the perceived convenience of business and perceived usefulness of business play a driving role in the members’ satisfaction with credit mutual assistance and their willingness to participate.Perception satisfaction with business plays a mediating role in the relationship between business perceived convenience,business perceived usefulness,and willingness to participate.The correlation between perceived business cost and perceived business satisfaction,and the willingness to continue to participate in the business is not significant,indicating that the current members of the staff have a strong demand for funds and are relatively insensitive to costs.Fourth,binary Logistic model was constructed to analyze the factors impacting the behavior of cooperative members participating in the mutual credit aid.The result shows that transforming trend of rural society from “strongly-related” to “weakly related” has become increasingly apparent.The trend weakens credit foundation based on the full communication of information in the rural “acquaintances society”.It is not enough to support the sustainable development of the credit mutual aid depending on “acquaintance” credit.It is necessary to change traditional “acquaintances” credit to modern credit records in rural areas.