Manufacturer And Supplier's R&D Cooperation Based Uncertainty Condition

When manufacture and supplier collaborate R&D, it face not only the traditional market uncertainty and technology uncertainty under singular enterprise organization, but also the new problem produced by consistency of collaborative parties'decision and incentive, this cause the form, influence and management of uncertainty under collaborative R&D more complexity compare to the R&D by singular enterprise organization.The original enterprises'cooperating objects are frequently unpractical. The unexpected changes of environment probably lead the original enterprises'objects being obstacle of cooperate. Under the collaborative R&D, enterprises need analyze the uncertainty before decision making; it would decide eventual resource devotion by apperception of uncertainties degree existent in collaborative R&D. The enterprise must making decision by the start stage of collaborative R&D, but whether the R&D could breakthrough the restriction of technology, the market performance new product could achieve and whether of not the partner would devote enough resource all are uncertainty. Under the uncertain condition, the innovating investment decisions by enterprises are always ahead of the future uncertainty open out, thus, the uncertainty under collaborative R&D would influence the decision making by enterprises. Based on forward consideration, this thesis would take the collaborative R&D by manufacture and supplier as the research masterstroke, discuss the uncertainty and its influence and reactivity, and attempt to carry through the research of several aspects underside: 1) what uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D and what is its different compare to the singular enterprise organization; 2)how these uncertainties influence the decision making of manufacture and supplier's collaborative R&D; 3) how manufacture and supplier reactive with the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D. Concretely, the following research has been developed in this thesis.Firstly, based on Das and Teng's risk model, distinguish, conclude and analysis the uncertainties and their exhibit form exist in collaborative R&D completely. Distinguished diversified uncertainty probably exist in multi-enterprise organization collaborative R&D, concluded these uncertainties'real source and their exhibition form, concluded differ uncertainties exist in which levels of collaborative R&D, simultaneity, analysis the influence to cooperate by uncertainties, and construct the system dynamics model of the random disturb influence to the collaborative R&D between enterprises by Forrester's system dynamic method.Secondly, in product development, the resource invested and the development assignments assumed by enterprise organization are greatly lying on the tradeoff with the anticipate income, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier. Taking the differ situations of manufacture R&D alone and manufacture-supplier R&D assignment sharing as the research object, the two parties'decision-making game was built, the influence of uncertainties to collaborative product development decision were analyzed and the differ product development situations were compared.Thirdly, utilize game theory, inducting the uncertainties under collaborative R&D recognized before to analysis the dynamic decision making process of R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier's technology R&D. Taking the two situations of supplier investment alone and manufacture-supplier joint investment as the research object, the two parties'decision-making Stackelberg game was built, the influence of uncertainty to decision were analyzed and the differ investment situations were compared.Lastly, within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, we take consideration of the incentive of supplier's effort and the incentive of manufacture's own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shared the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier's cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture's cost parameter of R&D effort.In conclusion, the innovation of this thesis can be summarized three aspects:â‘ distinguish, conclude and analysis the form, origin and their infection to the R&D cooperative relation of the uncertainties exist in collaborative R&D completely. The collaborative R&D of multi-enterprise would be faced not only the technology and market uncertainty inherently exist in R&D project, it also faced the behavior uncertainty from cooperate. The behavior uncertainty comes from inside level of R&D project, is a endogenesis technology; the technology uncertainty and market uncertainty are come from project level and outside level, are exogenous uncertainty. When market uncertainty is high, enterprise's desire of long term cooperate are high; when technology higher, enterprise wouldn't build long term collaborative relation; and behavior uncertainty higher, participators's confidence be lower to the partner's action of carry out the agreement, and it more possibly reduced the devotion in cooperation, so will depress the overall performance of R&D cooperate.â‘¡Based on the condition of uncertainty, research the dynamic decision making process of R&D assignment sharing by manufacture and supplier and R&D investment sharing by manufacture and supplier of supplier's technology R&D. Results shown the exist of technology uncertainty would reduced the devotion to collaborative R&D,come into being a technology feasibility threshold, probably lead the enterprise not carry R&D. Collaborative R&D could advance the devotion of enterprise's R&D investment; extend the consideration technology feasible set. Behavior uncertainty in cooperate would reduce the devotion and feasible set, meanwhile, in product development assignment share, the supplier join cooperation only relatively marginal profit and develop ability could reach some degree, choose a best proportion of assignment sharing; in process development, manufacture also have a best proportion of investment sharing, and the proportion increase by technology feasible of R&D.â‘¢Within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensate contract of collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensate contract, taking consideration of the incentive of supplier's effort and the incentive of manufacture's own effort. Through a component technology price, the contract realized transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, shares the output, and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint of supplier participate in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decrease with the supplier's cost parameter of R&D effort, and increase with the manufacture's cost parameter of R&D effort.