Research On Supply Chain Quality Cost Sharing Contract Based On Wholesale Price Contract

Supply Chain Quality Management, is a macro level consideration of the coordination, integration and optimization of quality functions and activities between supply chain member companies, which based on the internal quality management of these companies. Contract design, which based on product quality, is an implementation way of supply chain quality management, i.e., the product quality punishment contract and product quality guarantee contract which signed between suppliers and buyers. Moreover, in different projects, it can be divided into different supply chain contracts which based on internal fault or external fault. The supply chain internal fault means buyers check out some nonconforming products in the supplier’s incoming inspection, and the external fault means customers find out some quality problems when using the products. Core enterprises need to restrict the behaviors of supply chain members, reduce opportunistic, and improve their cooperative and quality management efficiency through contract management.This article summarizes domestic and foreign research results on supply chain management, and studies a quality contract design problem under the circumstance of product quality failure in a two-echelon supply chain which composed by a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral buyer. The main research contents are as follows:(1) The supply chain quality cost-sharing contract research regardless of the secondary processing. It established a two-echelon supply chain model with a wholesale price contract. By using the principal-agent method and based on the optimal solution of supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, it calculated the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation factors under three circumstances of information asymmetry. It designed an optimal quality cost-sharing contract and conducted analysis of examples.(2) The quality cost-sharing contract research of independent product structure with secondary processing. It considered the buyers optimal quality contract design with simple secondary processing. Based on the optimal solution of supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, it calculated the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation factors in the unilateral moral hazard situation with independent product structure.(3) The quality cost-sharing contract research of related product structure with secondary processing. It discussed the optimal quality contract design problem in situations when the buyers conducted secondary processing for intermediate products and parts and this secondary processing may affect the quality of final product. Based on the previous researches, it established a revenue model of related product structure, calculated the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation factors in the unilateral moral hazard situation and conducted an analysis and discussion. The analysis results indicate that when the supplier is in the unilateral moral hazard situation and the buyer conducted secondary processing, the relationship between product structures does not affect the internal loss cost for the supplier. When the buyer is in the unilateral moral hazard situation and it has some internal losses, both the secondary processing and the relationship between product structures do not affect the internal loss cost for the supplier. When it has some external faults, the external cost allocation factors are same in the situations of independent product structures and non-secondary processing and if the product structures are related, the supplier would not have any external loss cost.