| As the trend of the economic globalization and trade liberalization intensifies,especially after our country joined the WTO, the agricultural products trade in ourcountry has obtained the rapid development, but also faced with great pressures. Atthe same time, with China’s rapid economic development and constantly improvingpeople’s standard of living, people’s food consumption has put forward higherrequirements on the quality and brand, personalized and diversified expectations alsocontinue to be enhanced, which require urgently to further optimize the quality andstructure of China’s agricultural products. The geographical indication certification onagricultural products can rapidly improve the market competitiveness of agriculturalproducts and promote the healthy development of agriculture. However, China’sgeographical indication agricultural products drop behind the western developedcountries in the management mechanism, brand awareness and business model;especially in recent years, the quality safety accidents on China’s geographicalindication agricultural products have taken place frequently.In the face of these facts, based on GI theory, agricultural product qualitymanagement theory, spatial economics theory, principal-agent theory and game theory,taking the geographical indication agricultural products industrial chain as theresearch object, for the purpose of improving the consistency on the quality of thegeographical indication agricultural products, from two perspectives of the internalgovernance and external regulation, this paper puts forward the quality maintenancestrategies of geographical indications agricultural products.Firstly, this paper makes the empirical research on the degree of balanceddevelopment, the status of quality management, the existing problems on qualitymanagement and the key links of quality control and so on. Then, four researchquestions are proposed, which are how to promote the production standards ofgeographical indication primary agricultural products effectively, how to construct thecooperation mechanism of quality maintenance on geographical indication processingagricultural products, how to carry out the vertical governance of quality maintenanceon geographical indication processing agricultural products and how to govern thecounterfeit of geographical indication agricultural products in circulation stage.For the standardization promotion of geographical indication primary agriculturalproducts, this paper analyzes empirically the production organization patterns anddefines the key factors that influence the quality; from the objective of improving the degree of standardization, it constructs double multi-task principal-agent model anddesigns the incentive mechanism to solve the decentralized operation of the farmerswhich leads to the uneven quality levels.For the cooperation mechanism of quality maintenance on geographical indicationprocessing agricultural products, this paper has empirical analysis on the productionorganization patterns and determines the processing enterprises as the crucial sectorsto control the quality; on this basis, taking the reputation sharing of the geographicalindication agricultural products as the breakthrough point, it uses evolutionary gametheory and analyzes the evolvement mechanism on carrying out quality maintenancecooperation of processing enterprises.In order to further improve vertical coordination on quality control of thegeographical indication processing agricultural products, this paper uses the industrialchain vertical governance theory to analyze the definition and mode on the verticalgovernance of quality maintenance on geographical indication processing agriculturalproducts, constructs the multiple game model inluding farmers, processing enterprisesand local government, analyzes the behaviors of all stakeholders and puts forward themanagement countermeasures.For the counterfeit governance of geographical indication agricultural products incirculation stage, from the perspective of government regulation, based on analysis ofthe necessity of improving government regulation strength and the implementationprinciple of government regulation, this paper constructs the counterfeit governancemodel based on government supervision strength and analyzes quantitatively theseparation effect of true geographical indication agricultural products and fakegeographical indication agricultural products. |
