A Study On The Innovation Of Logistics Finance Service And Its Incentive Mechanism Based On The Dual Principal-agent Mode

As the rapid development of logistics finance services in China, more and more Smalland Medium-sized Enterprises have gained credit funds and improved funds chain;logistics finance services in China also has open up new profit marketplace for a lotof logistics enterprises and financial institutions. Because of the existence ofinformation asymmetry, logistics enterprises and financial institutions are confrontedwith much risk. Such as financial institutions gammon solely or make cahoots withlogistics enterprises, and some logistics enterprises are careless with surveillance themerchandise which have been impawned. All of these problems restrict the furtherdevelopment of logistics finance service innovation.Based on the above background, from the perspective of information asymmetry, thisdissertation selects the innovation model of and the contractual relationships oflogistics finance services as the research object, and this dissertation mainly analysesthe innovation and its incentive mechanism of the logistics financial service based onthe Dual Principal-agent, which based on the theories of Principal-Agent andinventive mechanism disign. Specifically speaking, after reviewing and analyzing thedifferent kinds of models of the traditional logistics financial service, this dissereationfirstly identifies the existence of the Dual-Principal agent relationship in the differentkinds of the logistics finance service models; and then based on the system analysisof the inner power about the logistics financial service, we study systematically themain modes of the logistics financial service innovation from the perspective of theoperational process, and use the Taiwanese cases to study the the logistics financialservice innovation under the asymmetric information.Finally, this dissertation establishes a game theory model involved with the threeparticipants of logistics finance service, and analyzes their optima equilibriumstrategies. In order to reduce the agent risks, we try to design a kind of effectivemechanism, which can inspirit and restrict the agents. In other words, we explore theincentive mechanisms of the financial institutions and the logistics enterprises. Wesuggest the financial institutions should carry on the reasonable reward-mechanism and reputation incentive mechanism, and the logistics enterprises should adopt thegrading financing pattern and establish the quota mechanism. Basend on the study ofthe incentive mechanisms, this dissertation provides several countermeasures for thedevelopment of logistics finance incentive mechanisms, in order to reduce the agentrisks ensuring the success of logistic finance services.