The Risk Of Investment Incentives Under The Double Principal-agent Research

In the era of knowledge economy, ventrue capital was located in the important position because of its important effect to the high-tech small&medium enterprises. But, with the appearance of the ventrue capital, there is the two-ply mechanism of principal-agent problem:firstly, the serious asymmetry of information between the investors and the venture capitalists, resuts in the first layer of principal-agent problem; secondly, the asymmetry of information between the venture capitalists and the enterpreneurs, resuts in the second layer of principal-agent problem. Based on those two principal problem,there were lots of research about how to reduce the gent cost through a rational incentive mechanism constrain. Many lectures study the contract in venture capital from different sides, and give different suggestions. In a word, to solve the special principal-agent porblem, thinking of the three participants,try to design a kind of effective mechanism, which can inspirit and restrict the agent, and ensure the ventrue capital developing properously.Through the analysis of the theory, problem of the two principal-agent problem, we use the model and the case give the feasible solution to the principal-agent problem in the veture capital. At last, according to the fact of our coutry's venture capital, give the suggestions of incentive mechanism. The success of veture capital depends on this kind of problem can be solved effectively. There is certain reference value to the settlement of the principal-agent problem of venture capital.