Research On The Development And Management Of Chinese Coal Resourcel Based On The Institutional Innovation

Coal Resources are scarce and unrenewable onetime resources in China. The property rights of them are owned by the State, and they are public goods. The coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge, this results in over-exploitation of coal resources, and causes serious problems, such as a huge waste of coal resources, frequent occurrences of mining accidents and destruction of the ecological environment.Based on the related theoretical foundation of economic and management in the exploitation of public coal resources, and follows the replacements of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources, this paper analyzes the historical changes of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources.Meanwhile, this paper analyzes the induced factors of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources, thinking that the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources is the result of economic transition, growth pattern, defects in the current system, contradiction between supply and demand, and the entry of WTO. It bases on the institutional innovation theory, takes the property rights of coal resources as the point. The main defects are that the government implements planned allocation of coal resources, and the coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge. Against these main defects and draw on the development and management experience of American coal resources, this paper presents a basic framework of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources. The main contents are as follows:First, this paper establishes a value model of the coal resource and an auction model of mining rights, makes an analysis on the marketing of coal resources and the optimal auction, and provides a theoretical and decision-making basis for the paid use system construction of coal resources by the government. It establishes a value model of the coal resource and analyzes the marketing of coal resources, pointing out that the marketing of coal resources is the optimal allocation way and provides institutional resolutions for the fundamental problem that coal resources are long detained out of market. It also establishes an auction model of mining rights, sets optimal reserve price and discusses optimal auction for the mining rights of coal resources. When the government announces the information of reserve price, the competitive enterprises will adjust the valuation range and then the price, deducing the two best choices for the optimal profit auction of the government: more than minimum auction and less than minimum auction. It points out that the auction of mining rights is the effective way for the marketing of coal resources. Based on the value of coal resources and the profit space of enterprises, developing reasonable minimum auction price and setting optimal reserve price can provide solutions for the low price problem in the auction of mining rights and the shortfall of the government's expect profit.Secondly, this paper constructs a tripartite game model of mine safety monitoring mechanism, analyzing the behavior of the government, the coal mine enterprisers and the coal mine managers. If the government constructs a high compensation system for the death of miners, the non-equilibrium of mine safety monitoring system will evolves to equilibrium. This paper establishes a game model of the simple fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, a game model of the heavier fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, and a game model of high compensation for the death of miners. It analyzes the simple fine case and gets a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As the coal mining enterprises are droved by benefit, even if the government fines these enterprises, they will also reduce the input for coal mine production safety. The ineffective supervision of the government is one of the main reasons for the frequent occurrences of mining accidents. It also analyzes the heavier fine case and gets a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but said that this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium isn't the optimal solution for this game and isn't a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Then it makes an analysis in the high compensation system for the death of miners, gets a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and points out that the government can reduce unnecessary supervision methods but make the supervision more efficient. At last, it establishes principal-agent models of coal mine enterprisers and managers in the asymmetric information case and in the can't be controlled and uncertain natural case, and a incentive model from enterprises'owners to managers. It analyzes the relative facts for the efforts of the managers, thinking that coal mining is a high-risk industry, and as a manager of coal mining, managers should be responsible for the coal mine production safety. The government can construct a high compensation system for the death of miners, intensify punishment and strengthen supervision. Through this dynamic conduction mechanism, coal mining enterprisers will increase the input for coal mine production safety, establish a perfect incentive mechanism and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the managers.Thirdly, this paper constructs an eco-environment compensation model. In terms of resource external theory, this paper makes a research on the ecological environment problem with the method of game theory, and discuss on the compensating mechanism to the ecological environment in the exploitation of coal resources. It suggests on the Law of Trade Compensation, Law of Control Compensation, Law of High Threshold Compensation and Law of Transfer Compensation. It also suggests that the government should raise the new coal mining enterprises'threshold of ecological environment, rigidify market access, and carry out a compensating system to the ecological environment.Finally, this paper makes an empirical study for the development and management of coal resources in Chongqing, and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.