An Experimental Study On Learning And Strategic Teaching During Interaction Among Individuals With Heterogeneous Knowledge

It is necessary to explore the updating process of individual knowledge, which through out the transition from hierarchical institutions of decision to horizontal coordination in market system, under traditional knowledge in a specific planning economy. Using the sampled investigation data from Nanjing residential communities, statistical results show that the essence of transition dilemma of Common Pool Resource governance in residential community is owners' cognitive dissonance lead by the bound of decision knowledge. After the absence of state provision, most owners still prefer to gain the decision-making right of the commons while averse from the matching duty of providing. Then we present the problem on capturing the process of interactive coordination, adjusting of belief and decision-make rule and acquiring new knowledge.Applying paradigm of evolutionary dynamic process and equilibrium analysis, this paper explored the choice of governing model based on individual knowledge acquirement. The main work of this paper is as following.(1) The problem on common pool resource governance in residential community is treated as public good and collective action theory in classic literature. Considering the particularity of transition economy, we firstly introduced knowledge learning behavior into social economic transiting process, focusing on the inner relationship among individual cognitive state adjusting, acquisition of knowledge and institutional change. We also integrated existing individual learning models, using on individual coordination during CPR provision.(2) This paper systemically researched strategic teaching behavior during repeated coordination games. The research was extent from two persons 3×3×3 repeated coordination game to three persons minimum effort game, then the relation between knowledge heterogeneity and strategic teaching was investigated. In this paper we also paid attention to the motivation and risk of strategic teaching.(3) For the first time, this paper introduced the setting of knowledge heterogeneity in experimental game, that made one of partners know both the payoffs according to his choices and other partners', while another only know his own payoffs according to his choices, then we can studied the performance under different knowledge states. Here we also demonstrated how subjects adjust their belief and decision make rule when we replaced their opponents by computers who chose fixed action from beginning to end. We distinguished Level 0 players who randomized and chose each strategy with probability 1/3, Level 1 players who chose the best response to his opponent's last period's action, and Level 2 players whose best response to last period's outcome is the strategy which his opponent could be choosing according to Ehrblatt-Hyndman-Ozbay-Schotter model, using experimental data.The experiment results indicate that, (1) for two persons 3×3 and three persons 3×3×3 pure strategy games, there are strategic teaching behavior significantly. The matched subjects with teaching behavior converge more frequently than these without teaching behavior. The matched subjects with knowledge heterogeneity converge less frequently than these with knowledge homogeneity. When the scale of players expands, the role of teaching in facilitating convergence to unique pure strategy equilibria is decreasing. As their motive, successful teachers' payoffs more than those players who do not converge, while less than followers significantly.(2) For repeated fixed matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and knowledge homogeneity, EHOS model best fits these data. It captures both backward-looking and forward-looking characters in the process of individual belief formation and decision-making. Its Goodness-of-fit is also improved. For repeated random matching experimental games with knowledge heterogeneity and playing with computers who chose the same action during games, reinforcement model performs best, which is led by the extent of uncertainty of situations players facing.(3) Corresponding to issues come from transition of governance of common pool resource in residential community, its key factor is the knowledge updating process of house-owners, as they are the main inner partner of governing the common pool resource. As an outer partner, what the government should do is to transform its duty from management to service, clear away the obstacles of self-governing, and avoid to reinforce house-owners' dependent on the government and discourage them to learning new decision knowledge.