| Industry-University-Research Cooperation (IURC) plays an important role in building an innovative country and innovation-driven economy. Considerable progress has been made in the national and regional IURC levels. However, there are till many problems included lack of motivation, unobvious effectiveness, few in-depth IURC at the enterprise level, In that context, this study focuses on three issues in the formation process of IURC:(1)Which enterprise in the emerging industry or mature industry are more likely to cooperate with IUR?(2) Whether IURC could been promoted by University and Research institution with the ability of commercialization?(3) What is the impact of "Tit for Tat" which is a classic strategy in cooperative theory on the stable strategies in IURC game?This study is based on the perspective of hierarchical evolution and the hypothesis of bounded rationality, using open innovation theory, evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods.Starting with the literature review and analysis of the practical background, both sides of IURC are divided according to the industry life cycle and the development stages of universities.Then, in term of three dimensions as competition&cooperation game among companies and between two sides of IURC and an asymmetric repeat "prisoner’s dilemma" game, discussing the formation mechanism of IURC at the micro-level of enterprise and how the classic strategy of cooperation evolution is applied to IURC.Finally, validating the theoretical analysis results with the use of numerical simulation and case studies.The main Innovative conclusions of this study as follows:(1) When there is a certain level of skills in different industries and same cooperative income, in the short term, the muture companies are more inclined to cooperate with university or research institution;(2) The common technologies between industries have a significant impact on the formation of IURC. when a large gain are able to be got and the revenue-sharing ratio between industries lies in a certain range. Both of these companies are more likely to choose IURC in the scenario1(developing the common technology and staying outside of another industry);(3) Whether in the muture industry or emerging industry, when a university or research institution has commercial capabilities, both of the process complexity and the possibility of betrayal in IURC will increase, the formation conditions of IURC will be raised, however, for the companies in mature industry, in case of the absence of opportunism or lower earnings of opportunism, the cooperative conditions might also be lowered;(4)IURC has positive correlation with penal sum coefficient, and negative correlation with cooperation risk coefficient and betrayal gain coefficient, and inverted U-shaped relationship with cooperative innovative value-added, and also has positive correlation with degree of openness within limits;(5) By means of the simulation methods, We find that " Tit for Tat" strategy also may be applied to an asymmetric cooperative evolutionary game, the overall level of IURC could be improved by adopting the " Tit for Tat " strategy with kind-hearted, no betrayal at first and to be provocated between both sides of IURC.This paper adopts cutting-edge methods such as the evolutionary game theory from biology and the modeling&simulation of discrete systems from computer science.expands the theory of IURC at the micro-level of enterprise and the application scope of classical strategies in the theory of cooperative evolution, their actual results also were validated, provides the theoretical and policy basis to promote IURC effectively. |
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