Research On The Governance Mechanism Of Government-Enterprise Cooperation Contract In The "Xinji" Ice And Snow Economic Bel

In recent years,the high-quality development of the ice and snow economy has put forward new requirements for technological innovation and business model innovation,and the need to improve the quality and upgrading of the industrial economy calls for a good social environment,ice and snow business environment and healthy government-enterprise relations.In March 2021,Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Jilin Province jointly signed a strategic cooperation framework agreement to jointly build a high-quality development pilot zone for ice and snow economy in China(Changbai Mountains-Altai Mountains)to jointly promote the high-quality development of the ice and snow industry.In this context,this study first starts from the current situation and competitiveness level of the development of ice and snow industry clusters in the two places,obtains some policy documents and materials through interviews with relevant people,and understands the progress of the construction of the ice and snow economic belt.Taking the improved GEMS model as the analysis framework,the previous relevant literature was reviewed and analyzed,the secondary indicators of the model were adjusted,the tertiary indicators were set,and the SE entropy method was used to quantitatively empower the model factors.Finally,the competitiveness score of each factor of the model is measured by expert scoring,so as to analyze the overall competitiveness level of the ice and snow industry clusters of the two places and the performance of each subdivision,and combine the content of the plan to analyze the field and characteristic attributes of the main projects in the subsequent construction,comprehensively apply the theory and hypothesis before and after the conclusion of the contract theory to analyze the interaction behavior of each participant in the cooperation,analyze how to solve the information asymmetry problem in the government cooperation project,and how to distribute the remaining decision-making power and property rights.Avoid problems such as alienation of goals,excessive discretion and lack of internal supervision in the government’s cooperation,and build a contractual governance mechanism for cooperation between governments and enterprises in the construction of the ice and snow economic belt.Through the verification of the competitiveness of the ice and snow industry clusters in the two provinces,it is found that the common points are that the core elements of the ice and snow industry are relatively high,and the scores are low in the supporting factors around the ice and snow industry,as well as the regional economic foundation and public foundation,the difference is that Jilin basically leads Xinjiang in most aspects,reaching a level close to excellent.After obtaining the quantitative results of competitiveness level,based on the incomplete contract,this paper conducts qualitative research on the relevant fields of the ice and snow economic belt,discusses the subject behavior and the distribution of interests and powers in the subsequent construction of government-enterprise cooperation,and constructs the mechanism optimization countermeasures of contract governance from five aspects: government-enterprise relationship,whole-process information,residual right renegotiation mechanism,supervision system,and inter-government cooperation.The renegotiation mechanism of residual rights is the key point,and the key is to judge from the nature of the project,the nature of the cooperative subject,and the degree of publicity.For public welfare units,more power distribution and less financial distribution will be given when cooperating with strong public projects;When cooperating with weak public projects or for-profit projects,more financial distribution and less power distribution are given.For enterprise-type for-profit units,when cooperating with strong public projects,more financial distribution and less power distribution will be given;When cooperation is weak,public or profitable,more power is distributed and less money is distributed.