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Research On Opportunism Behavior Of Stakeholders In Material Procurement Of Major Projects

Posted on:2024-01-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X YaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569307175957019Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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Along with the enhancement of the national comprehensive strength,a batch of major infrastructure construction projects that are very important for social and economic development spring up around the whole country.However,the huge investment amount,much more participants,high construction difficulty and other features make the organization and governance of major engineering difficult.Materials procurement is the key stage in the whole cycle of major engineering.There are many corruptions and opportunistic behaviors in the procurement process due to such features as huge procurement amounts,multiple types of procurement and much more stakeholders,which affect the construction quality and completion effect of an engineering project.For the organization and management problems of major engineering in China,relevant scholars have an exploration on its governance theory and research framework,but they have not refined it to other stages of the construction.The profound research on the cooperative behavior of the stakeholders in material procurement is vital for the high-quality completion of the procurement activity.The specific study content of this paper is shown as follows aspects.There was an identification of the three procurement modes of material procurement in the major engineering projects,and they were the procurement modes led by the owner,general contractor and construction unit.Then,there was an analysis of the implementation motivation of the opportunistic behaviors of stakeholders under the three procurement modes.First,the owner led procurement model opportunism behavior analysis.Under such a situation,the material procurement would be mainly on the key materials with significant quality weight and long cycle,which would be led by the owner to dock and work with suppliers.Hence,it was selected with variables to build up an evolutionary game model for both parties.It was concluded with the solution for the model to gain the optimal strategy and evolutionary equilibrium point and then there was a test on the influencing factors with simulation.Second,It was about the analysis of the opportunistic behaviors of the procurement mode led by the general contractor.The procurement of general contractors under the EPC mode accounted for the largest proportion of the entire procurement activity.Under such a situation,the stakeholders would be the general contractor,procurement department and supplier.Through problem analysis,it was selected with the variables to build up an evolutionary game model for the three parties.Finally,the influence of all variables on the evolutionary game direction was tested with simulation.Third,It was about the analysis of the opportunistic behaviors of the procurement mode led by the construction unit.The study of the opportunistic behaviors of relevant participants in the procurement process with the construction unit as the procurement subject was built with the general contract–construction unit supervision model under the condition of asymmetric information,so as to discuss the game behavior of the two parties under the static games of incomplete information.According to the previous analysis,this paper focuses on the management strategy of the stakeholders under different procurement modes,and it is mainly drawn with the dominant conclusions as follows.Hidden profit loss and risk loss factors are positive for the behaviors of the owner and supplier,and both parties should build up a long-standing partnership and improve the supplier management system and evaluation standards.The reward and punishment factors,hidden profit losses,and speculative profit factors are positive for the behaviors of the general contractor,procurement department and suppliers,so the regulation should be enhanced and strict reward and punishment measures should be formulated.Regulatory cost,fine and the benefit coefficient for implementing opportunistic behaviors are negative for the behavior of the construction unit and general contractor,so it should improve the regulatory mechanism and enforce the punishment to reduce the loss caused by the asymmetric information.
Keywords/Search Tags:Major engineering projects, Procurement activities, Opportunistic behavior, Evolutionary game, Numerical simulation
PDF Full Text Request
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