Research On The Effect Of Salary Limit Order On Innovation Ability Of State-owned Enterprises

As one of the important contents in the field of income distribution system in China,the compensation gap between senior executives and ordinary employees has been highly concerned by the society for a long time,which has led academic circles and relevant government departments to explore the deficiencies in the internal compensation design of enterprises,with the focus on the compensation structure and level.At present,the academic research on the compensation level mainly focuses on the direct economic consequences of the internal compensation gap for enterprises,while the research on combining it with the independent innovation and R&D ability of enterprises is relatively small.In the environment where the country vigorously promotes enterprises to take technological innovation as the core driving force for development,the internal independent innovation motivation of enterprises is insufficient,and the level of innovation and R&D investment is low,which will not only weaken the sustainable development ability of enterprises,It will even affect the level of market economy and national innovation and development.Therefore,setting up a reasonable internal incentive system,stimulating the enthusiasm of all employees and improving the risk tolerance of senior executives will help them make strategic decisions in line with the innovation and development of enterprises in their daily operations.As an important explicit incentive channel in the incentive system,monetary compensation incentive,if not restricted,will lead to serious unfair income distribution.Therefore,in order to limit the excessive growth of executive pay and improve China’s salary distribution system,six departments including the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security jointly issued the Guidance on Further Standardizing the Salary Management of Central Enterprise Principals in 2009.The 2009 fixed salary order clearly stipulates that the annual salary of executives is limited to about600000,but many studies have proved that the salary limit has not fundamentally reduced the salary level of state-owned enterprise executives;In August 2014,the Central Committee adopted the "Reform Plan for the Compensation System of the Principals of Central Enterprises",which stipulates that it will be implemented from January 1,2015.The gap between the salary of senior executives and the average salary of employees should not be more than 8 times.Some empirical data show that the salary policy of 2015 has achieved the expected salary limit effect in the short term,but whether the long-term policy benefit effect is significant still needs further study.The2015 fixed year salary policy has spanned eight accounting years since its implementation,which can provide a good natural experiment for us to explore the relationship between the fixed year salary policy and the independent innovation and R&D ability of enterprises.Therefore,this paper takes the 2015 fixed year salary policy as an exogenous policy impact to explore the incentive effect of the independent innovation and R&D ability of enterprises in the context of the fixed year salary policy.This paper takes the "salary limit order" policy issued and implemented in 2015 as the explanatory variable,and takes the A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020 as the sample data,and establishes a double difference model to study the impact of the internal salary gap as an intermediary effect on the innovation and R&D investment of state-owned enterprises and the regulatory effect of equity incentive policy in the context of salary regulation.According to the main effect regression results,we draw the conclusion that the 2015 year salary policy has a significant positive incentive effect on the innovation and R&D activities of enterprises.We refuse to assume H1,in which the equity concentration,the combination of two positions,the size of independent directors,the growth ability of enterprises,the size of enterprises and other control variables have a significant incentive effect on the investment in independent innovation and R&D of enterprises,while the asset-liability ratio,the age of enterprises Cash flow and other control variables are negatively correlated with innovation and R&D investment.According to the regression results of the regulatory effect,we draw the conclusion that the equity incentive policy plays a regulatory role in the relationship between the wage limit order and enterprise innovation,and the existence of the equity incentive policy helps to strengthen the positive incentive effect of the wage limit order on the independent innovation and research of enterprises,supporting the hypothesis H2.Based on the regression results of the intermediary effect,the conclusion is drawn that the 2015 fixed salary policy has narrowed the internal salary gap to a certain extent,and the smaller the internal salary gap,the higher the level of independent innovation and R&D investment of enterprises.The possible innovation points of this paper are as follows: firstly,under the background of the dual policies of salary limit order and equity incentive,explore the incentive effect on the independent innovation ability of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,introduce the internal salary gap as an intermediary factor,and improve the research content and policy recommendations from this perspective.Finally,this paper uses the double difference method to conduct empirical analysis,avoiding the endogenous problems caused by sample selection bias and missing key variables.Based on the macro and micro perspective,this topic has practical significance for state-owned enterprises to optimize the salary structure and promote independent innovation and research and development of enterprises,and provides theoretical basis for the reform of salary system such as salary restriction order.