Research On Regulatory Mechanism For Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Projects Of Farmland Consolidation

As an effective way to optimize the allocation of land resources,farmland consolidation is an important platform to promote agricultural and rural modernization and urban-rural integration.However,the current existing mode of traditional agricultural land improvement dominated by government investment is difficult to meet the needs of agricultural and rural modernization,such as the pressure of financial funds,low investment efficiency,industrial difficulties,insufficient participation of farmers and other problems.In order to efficiently promote the work of farmland consolidation and realize the comprehensive revival of rural areas,the Chinese government vigorously promotes the application of the PPP model of farmland consolidation,but it also faces many problems in the practice process: as an emerging product in the field of land consolidation,the PPP project of farmland consolidation has not yet formed special legal support;When the supervision is weak,enterprises will often be driven by interests to reduce the degree of compliance with policy objectives,take illegal construction and operation behaviors,accelerate the recovery of early investment costs,and even use PPP projects to extract government funds.Therefore,this paper firstly combined stakeholder theory and relevant literature research to sort out the current situation of supervision of PPP projects of rural land renovation,define the core interest subjects involved in the supervision of rural land renovation PPP projects,clarify the game relationship between them,and construct the game theoretical analysis framework of multi-agent supervision.Secondly,based on the theoretical framework,a two-dimensional evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises under the independent supervision of the government and a three-dimensional evolutionary game model between the government,farmers and enterprises under the cooperative supervision of the government and farmers were constructed,and the evolutionary stability of each game party’s strategy selection was analyzed to reveal the influence mechanism of key elements.Finally,numerical simulation is carried out with the help of MATLAB software,and visual verification analysis is carried out on the influence of key elements on the evolution process and results of each game party,so as to provide corresponding control strategies for promoting the evolution of enterprise strategy to the ideal stable result of compliance implementation of agricultural land consolidation,in order to provide reference for the development of supervision mechanism of PPP projects of agricultural land consolidation.We will give full play to the key role of farmland renovation PPP projects in promoting agricultural modernization.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)There are two main game relationships in the supervision of PPP projects of rural land consolidation.That is,considering whether farmers participate in the supervision or not,it can be divided into two regulation game modes: independent supervision by the government and cooperative supervision by the government and farmers.In the mode of independent government supervision,the government can formulate and implement a series of incentive or regulatory measures to encourage and constrain the illegal behaviors of enterprises,fix the "profit-driven" defects of enterprises in both ways,and drive enterprises to carry out the PPP projects of rural land renovation with integrity and efficiency.In the mode of government-farmer cooperative supervision,On the one hand,the government can encourage the supervision of farmers through policy improvement and publicity;on the other hand,farmers can exert public opinion pressure on the inactive government through letters,visits,reports and other means,thus producing a joint supervision effect on the enterprises’ participation in agricultural land consolidation.(2)For enterprises,in the mode of independent supervision by the government,it is an effective way to avoid illegal construction and operation of enterprises to improve their agricultural land operation income;The government’s measures of reward and punishment can play an important role in regulating the behavior of enterprises.Increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help to mobilize the enterprise’s enthusiasm of honesty and efficient regulation of agricultural land.In the government-peasant household cooperative supervision model,the supervision of peasant household is included into the game system,in addition to the above conclusions,and the expansion of corporate reputation loss can effectively inhibit the occurrence of corporate violations.(3)For the government,in the mode of independent government supervision,supervision cost is the core factor affecting the government’s choice of strategy.Excessive supervision cost will aggravate the government’s financial pressure and discourage the government’s enthusiasm for supervision.The government’s reward and punishment measures also have an impact on its own behavior,but the direction of the effect is not completely consistent.Increasing the intensity of incentives is not conducive to the government’s active performance of supervision responsibilities in the rural land renovation PPP projects,but increasing the intensity of punishment can effectively promote the government’s active actions.In the government-farmer cooperative supervision model,the supervision of farmers into the game system,in addition to the above conclusions,at this time to impose the dual pressure of public opinion and superior government accountability,and set a reasonable reward for reporting,can effectively promote the government to improve the supervision work.(4)For farmers,improving the construction of multilevel supervision system,raising the reward standard for reporting,and effectively reducing the supervision cost of farmers can greatly mobilize the enthusiasm of farmers to participate in supervision.Based on this,the recommendations are as follows:(1)Encourage agricultural scientific and technological innovation and knowledge sharing of agricultural technology to promote the effective growth of agricultural operating income.(2)Optimize the way of supervision,improve the efficiency of supervision,and implement the control mode based on punishment.(3)Stimulate the supervision role of farmers by multiple means,improve the construction of multilevel supervision system,and build a cooperative supervision system led by the government and participated by farmers.(4)Improve the vertical management mechanism of government departments,raise the appointment standards of civil servants,and enhance the governance capacity of government departments in various aspects.