| After the founding of new China,the collective ownership system of "three-level ownership and team-based ownership" was carried out in rural areas,which established the basic organizational form of rural property rights in China.After the reform and opening up,the rural collective economy has been developing continuously.After a series of remarkable achievements have been made,some institutional drawbacks have gradually emerged.The form of collective property rights has been continuously impacted by problems such as the absence of property rights subject,the dislocation of administrative subject and the unclear income distribution.Under the new historical conditions,the reform of the collective property right system is imperative,to push through the old and bring forth the new,and further promote the development and growth of the collective economy.In 2016,the Central Committee issued the Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Steadily Promoting the Reform of the Rural Collective Property Rights System,which officially promoted the reform from the national level.Up to now,most rural areas in China have completed the reform of the collective property rights system.Although the reform has accumulated a lot of excellent experience and practices,but in the reform process appeared more disputes,and the reform model is not the same.No matter what kind of reform mode,there must be a common logic behind it.This paper aims to discuss the attitudes and practices of different actors towards the reform,clarify the interest demands of each subject as much as possible,and then analyze the reform logic of collective property rights system,and put forward corresponding policy suggestions in order to improve the reform effect.Based on the perspective of stakeholders,this paper discusses the practical logic and effectiveness of the reform of collective property rights system from three different levels:local government,village committee and villagers.Through the game theory,property rights theory,principal-agent theory and other main theories,with the method of theoretical analysis put forward the main inference.Then,taking the reform of collective property rights system in HM District of Jiangsu Province as an example,this paper adopts the method of systematic sampling and stratified sampling,selects 6 sample towns and 8sample villages in the whole district,and adopts the method of in-depth interview to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation on the reform of collective property rights system in HM District.Through the interview with the local government staff,the attitude of the relevant departments to the reform and the main measures taken for the reform work are understood,and the reform motivation of the township government is analyzed.Through the interview with the relevant staff of the village committee,the basic situation of the village,their views on the reform of the collective property rights system and the difficulties faced in the reform work were understood,and the benefits and losses of the village committee were analyzed.Through interviews with the villagers to understand the implementation of the reform policy,the villagers’ participation,etc.,to analyze the villagers’ cognition of the reform and behavioral motivation.Theoretical analysis shows that the actual bearers of public service costs,the economic development of the village,the loss of collective assets and other historical issues,the proportion of the provident fund and the public welfare fund,etc.may become the focus of the game of all parties and an important factor affecting the reform.In terms of the optimal game equilibrium solution,the local government,villagers,and village committees should actively promote the implementation of reforms.Case analysis shows that the current reform has both political logic and economic logic.Under the hierarchical logic,due to factors such as assessment requirements,local governments have a positive and consistent attitude towards reforms,and when the government bears public service costs or gives villages some preferential policies,it will greatly increase the village committee ’ s enthusiasm for reform;differences in village endowments has an important influence on the reform attitude of the village committee.Under the influence of the government,the economic development status of the villages does not completely match the reform attitude of the village committee.Some villages with good(or bad)collective economy actively reform,and some villages with good(or bad)collective economy do not want to Regardless of the economic development status,the villages carried out the necessary propaganda at the beginning of the reform.However,in general,compared with the economically weak villages,the villages with better economic conditions are more inclined to actively reform and set a higher proportion of public welfare funds and Withdrawal of provident fund;in villages with loss of collective assets,the villagers have a higher degree of participation in the reform and have a more thorough understanding of the policy;because the survey area has not yet distributed dividends,the villagers are not very concerned about the ratio of the withdrawal of provident fund and public welfare fund,and the villagers are different The cognition of reform among groups is also different,the overall sense of acquisition of villagers is not high,and the enthusiasm for participation in reform is gradually decreasing.According to the research results and the case situation,and in view of the current reform situation of HM District,the following suggestions are mainly put forward: relax the restrictions on collective assets appropriately,encourage collective assets to participate in fair and reasonable market competition,develop and expand the village collective economy,realize dividend as soon as possible,and effectively improve the sense of gain of villagers;Attach importance to the participation of villagers and improve their recognition and acceptance of the reform;We should give consideration to both the beginning and the end,improve the degree of universal benefit of policies,give corresponding policy support to ordinary villages,make balanced use of resources,and improve the effectiveness of reform. |
