Research On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge On Corporate Financializatio

Against the background of rapid development of the financial market and increasing demand for corporate financing,equity pledges have come into being.As a new financing method,equity pledge has been favored by many listed companies due to its convenience and relatively low financing cost.However,behind the booming development of equity pledging business,it also brings potential risks to enterprises and even to the economy and society.After the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge,on the one hand,due to the volatility of the share price,the controlling shareholder may face the risk of forced liquidation and transfer of control,and on the other hand,due to the separation of ownership and cash flow rights caused by the equity pledge,the controlling shareholder’s motive of "emptying" may be intensified,and the controlling shareholder,in order to avoid the risk of transfer of control and achieve In order to avoid the risk of transfer of control and to obtain private profits,the controlling shareholders may increase the share price or obtain private gains through the hidden means of increasing the allocation of financial assets.However,as China’s economy is developing in the direction of high quality,the real economy is an important support for building strategic advantages for China’s future development,and should not be "from solid to virtual" at any time.Therefore,this paper discusses the impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledges on the corporate financialization,which is important to reduce the financial risks of real enterprises and maintain the stable and healthy development of the market economy.First,on the basis of introducing the background and significance of the study,we review the literature related to controlling shareholder equity pledges and corporate financialization and grasp the current research status;second,we define the connotation of controlling shareholder equity pledges and corporate financialization and elaborate the relevant theories,clarify the specific mechanism of controlling shareholder equity pledges affecting corporate financialization and propose a research hypothesis.Then we select A-share listed non-financial non-real estate companies from 2010 to 2020.Finally,we select non-financial and non-real estate listed enterprises in A-share from 2010 to 2020 as the research sample and apply the two-way fixed-effects model and the mediating-effects model to test the research hypotheses empirically.The research results show that: in the benchmark regression,controlling shareholder equity pledge increases the financialization level of enterprises,and the higher the pledge ratio,the deeper the financialization;in terms of pledge behavior,low controlling shareholder shareholding enhances the positive relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledge and enterprise financialization;however,in terms of pledge ratio,high controlling shareholder shareholding enhances the positive relationship between controlling shareholder equity pledge ratio and enterprise financialization However,in terms of the pledge ratio,a high percentage of controlling shareholders’ shareholding will enhance the positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ shareholding pledge ratio and corporate financialization;the combination of two positions can weaken the positive influence of controlling shareholders’ shareholding pledge on corporate financialization;equity incentives can weaken the positive influence of controlling shareholders’ shareholding pledge on corporate financialization;controlling shareholders’ shareholding pledge will intensify corporate financing constraints and thus deepen corporate financialization.Lastly,based on the above findings,relevant policy recommendations are put forward from the perspectives of listed enterprises,pledgees,regulators and government respectively,taking into account the actual situation...