| Since the 《Guarantee Law of the People’s Republic of China》was promulgated,with the continuous improvement of laws and regulations,equity pledge has become a common financing method for shareholders of listed companies.In recent years,due to problems such as overcapacity in the real economy,the profit rate has declined,and the return on financial investment has been high.The phenomenon of corporate financialization in my country’s real enterprises has squeezed out real investment.In response to this phenomenon,the government has introduced policy guidance Entity enterprises move from virtual to real.The controlling shareholder makes the pledge out of self-interest,but whether it is to meet its own capital needs or tunnel the listed company,it needs to stabilize the stock price to avoid losing control of the listed company.Therefore,the controlling shareholder may manage the market value by influencing the investment decision of the enterprise,and the characteristics of strong liquidity and high yield of financial assets have become a good choice for enterprise investment.This paper uses the listed companies in the non-financial and non-real estate industries of the SSE and SZSE from 2007 to 2018 as samples,and uses a multiple linear regression model for testing.The research found that:(1)The pledge of the controlling shareholder will significantly increase the degree of financialization of the enterprise,and the higher the pledge rate,the degree of financialization of the enterprise will continue to increase;(2)In the intermediary effect test model,it is found that financing constraints play a role in the variable relationship.Part of the intermediary effect,after the equity pledge,the company’s financing constraints are improved,and the company will increase the allocation of financial assets and improve the degree of financialization of the company when the financing environment deteriorates;(3)in the moderating effect test model,it is found that analysts’ attention has Moderating effect,that is,analysts’ attention strengthens corporate financialization behavior after equity pledge,but does not inhibit corporate financialization as an external governance mechanism;(4)In the heterogeneity test,it is found that the financialization phenomenon of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge is suppressed when the sample has a lower proportion of management shares,a lower proportion of controlling shareholders’ shareholding,or a higher degree of equity balance.On the whole,the pledge behavior of controlling shareholders will make enterprises more inclined to financial investment and lead to the financialization of enterprises.Therefore,regulators should start from improving the disclosure of equity pledge information,strengthening the external supervision mechanism,and limiting the high proportion of pledge control rights.Guide enterprises from the micro level to move from virtual to real. |
