Reseach On Cooperation Intention Of Fuzhou Xinyang Village Tourism Project Under The Background Of Rural Revitalization

In 2019,the Fujian Provincial Party Committee and Government issued the "Fujian Provincial Rural Revitalization Pilot Demonstration Work Plan" to guide rural areas in exploring the path to rural revitalization.Among them,developing tourism projects is an important way to achieve rural revitalization.At present,the ways to participate in rural revitalization tourism projects include government investment,enterprise financing,and collective self financing.In order to make up for their own shortcomings and avoid project risks,and achieve mutual benefit and win-win situation,all parties adopt cooperative methods to participate in the development of tourism projects.However,due to the imbalance in information,funds,and production factors held by all parties during the development process of the project,the distribution of interests among all parties is uneven,cooperation is not smooth,and even cooperation is broken,resulting in many potential tourism projects being aborted midway.How to reasonably allocate the interests of all parties,reduce conflicts and contradictions among various groups,and enhance the willingness of all parties to cooperate in rural tourism projects is of great significance for promoting the development of rural revitalization and tourism industry.First of all,on the basis of combing the research on the development of rural revitalization tourism industry at home and abroad,this paper proposes to apply the relevant theory of evolutionary game to study the cooperation willingness of all parties in the construction process of rural revitalization tourism pilot project.Through consulting and collecting relevant literature,we have a deep understanding of the concept of rural revitalization,stakeholder theory and evolutionary game theory,providing theoretical reserves and research direction for research work.Secondly,on the basis of field investigation and full investigation of Xinyang Village,Danyang Town,Fuzhou City,I have a detailed understanding of the basic situation,construction content and investment income composition of the project.Based on the stakeholder theory,I classify the main stakeholders,analyze the relationship between stakeholders,and determine the key stakeholders.In other words,local government,enterprise investors and village collective are the subjects of multi-party cooperation intention research of Xinyang village tourism pilot project.The factors influencing the willingness to cooperate were initially identified from the investment returns of economic and social benefits,and the main factors influencing the willingness to cooperate were determined based on the expert questionnaire.The game payment matrix of the willingness of local government,enterprise investors and village collective to participate in the tourism pilot project is constructed,and the replication dynamic equation of the three parties’ participation strategy is established.The replication dynamic analysis and stability analysis are carried out,and finally six equilibrium points under the corresponding stable conditions are obtained.Among them,the stable strategy balance of evolutionary game led by the government,the participation of enterprises and the village collective shares is the ideal balance point for the three parties to participate in the tourism project of Xinyang Village.Finally,this article uses MATLAB R2022 a software to simulate the evolutionary game model,conduct evolutionary path analysis,and verify the reliability of the model.Based on the real economic data and reasonable prediction data of the Xinyang Village tourism project,simulation values of various parameters are established.Through simulation analysis,the final evolution curve of the Xinyang Village tourism project is obtained,and the evolutionary game stability strategy of government leadership,enterprise participation,and village collective participation is determined.In order to further explore the influencing factors of tripartite cooperation willingness,a simulation analysis was conducted on the impact of different initial values and main parameters on the evolutionary game strategy.Two conclusions were drawn:firstly,changes in the initial values of cooperation willingness among the government,enterprises,and village collectives cannot change the results of the evolutionary game;Second,the five main parameters,namely,the construction cost of government investment,the cost of collective land,the additional income from government investment,the distribution proportion of enterprises in total operating income and the distribution proportion of enterprises in potential income,are the key factors affecting the willingness of the three parties to cooperate.Furthermore,targeted measures and suggestions are proposed to all parties involved in the pilot tourism project of Xinyang Village,in order to provide suggestions for the long-term development of the tourism project in Xinyang Village.