Game Analysis And Economic Simulation Of Institutional Changes Of China's Pension System

Ministry of Civil Affairs reported that the aging problem of China has entered a rapid development stage by 2008. Low fertility, aging population and hysteretic social security systems have become the major risks for development in the future. Therefore, some problems of the old-age insurance of enterprise employees in China should be concerned, and the enterprise annuity system which should be suitable for China will be constructed. Above two facets are the key links for the innovation of old-age insurance system in China, which is very meaningful for improving the social security system of our country. However, above problems should be overcome before the crisis of social security getting serious.Firstly, this thesis elaborates the relationally basic theory about the contents of the enterprise annuity system, system traits and basic old-age insurance, commercial insurance, the relationship of financial capital market and so on. And it is useful for analyzing the substantive characteristics of enterprise annuity system. At the same time, the property, location and development of the enterprise annuity in China was found with a cross-section view. Above the achievements are obtained by comparative analysis of some typical foreign countries.Secondly, the compatible operation and management pattern of the enterprise annuity system could be analyzed by economical principle. This thesis agrees to take a high government intervention management model for the enterprise annuity system if the macro perspective was chosen. However, from the micro perspective, this paper combines with the Samuelson's overlapping model, and it also introduces the enterprise annuity system, so the DC model is obtained, which could reduce the burden of the finance, and the potential burden for government will also be avoided. So it is more suitable for the actual national situation of our country.Furthermore, this thesis profoundly interprets the game process among the core subjects of the enterprise annuity by using the theory of evolutionary game. And three different evolutionary game models of government, enterprise and the connection above are constructed, which analyze the compelling system transition by government, the inductive transition by enterprise or another transition by government and enterprise. It also shows the optimal strategy with different transition style, and the two conditions are found, which are essential for the transition of enterprise annuity system.Finally, this thesis simulates the process of the transition of China's enterprise annuity system by using matlab, and it also verifies the transformation. Moreover, above results show that the ideal and equilibrium conclusion can be gotten just in the stage of market-oriented regulation of the enterprise annuity system. After further simulating the influence for the equilibrium results of different parameters, the conclusion indicates that increasing the tax preference, improving the capital market and reducing the political cost of proclaiming the policy can all promote the transition of the enterprise annuity system toward the ideal and equilibrium direction, and the effect of the preferential policy is the biggest.