Research On Pricing Decision Of Cross-Brand Trade-in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

With the increasing conflict between resource consumption and environmental protection,and the continuous improvement of people’s environmental awareness,the development of green and low-carbon circular economy has become an inevitable trend.Stakeholders of the closed-loop supply chain also gradually join in the construction of circular economy.As a powerful tool for recycling and remanufacturing,trade-in is attracting more and more attention f rom enterprises and consumers.The traditional trade-in industry only allows consumers to return old products to the original brand or original manufacturer.However,some enterprises in the trade-in market not only support the trade-in consumers of their own brand to participate in the trade-in activities,but also support the trade-in consumers of other brands to trade in the old products of other brands.Cross-brand trade-in is beginning to occur in the market,especially in the digital electronics industry.There are few studies on cross-brand trade-in in the existing literature,and the influence of cross-brand trade-in on the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain is still unknown.Therefore,based on the realistic business situation of manufacturer’s cross-brand recycling and manufacturer and recycler’s joint cross-brand recycling in the market,this paper constructed a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model composed of a manufacturer,a retailer and a third-party recycler.The manufacturer is the leader of Stackelberg game in the closed-loop supply chain.Using backward induction and KKT conditions to solve the optimal decisions of the manufacturer’s recycling model without considering cross-brand trade-in(MN model),the third-party recycler’s recycling model without considering cross-brand trade-in(TN model),the manufacturer’s recycling model with considering cross-brand trade-in(MC model)and the third-party recycler’s recycling model with considering cross-brand trade-in(TC model).By analyzing the differences among the optimal decisions of the four models,the selection conditions of manufacturer’s trade-in recycling mode and cross-brand trade-in strategy were deduced.Matlab software is used to conduct numerical example analysis to explore the influence of consumer channel preference,trade-in market size,trade-in product depreciation rate and trade-in cooperation coefficient between the third-party recycler and the manufacturer on same-brand/cross-brand trade-in dual-channel closed-loop supply chain.This paper provides theoretical basis for closed-loop supply chain enterprises to choose recycling methods and trade-in strategies.The paper shows that the choice of trade-in recycling mode in the closed-loop supply chain depends on the size of the trade-in market.The closed-loop supply chain under manufacturer recycling mode is suitable for cross-brand trade-in strategy.The selection of cross-brand trade-in strategy in the closed-loop supply chain under the third-party recycler recycling mode is determined by the market size of c ross-brand trade-in consumers.Under the same recycling mode,the choice of cross-brand trade-in strategy will not change the optimal online direct selling price,wholesale price,retail price and recycling price of the same brand trade-in products.The optimal online direct selling price,wholesale price and retail price of the closed loop supply chain under the third-party recycler recycling mode are always lower than the optimal price under the manufacturer recycling mode.The improvement of consumers’ preference for online direct channel is beneficial to the developmen t of closed loop supply chain.However,the continuous expansion of same-brand/cross-brand trade-in market is not conducive to closed-loop supply chain.The increase in the depreciation rate of old and new products leads to the increase in manufacturers’ profits,while the profit of recyclers decreases first and then increases.Only when the cooperative cost coefficient between recyclers and manufacturers at a low level,it is beneficial to increase the cooperative cost coefficient.