| Along with the improvement of our per capita disposable income,people consumption concept upgrading,regional brands of agricultural products get increasing attention.However,the difficulty in quality identification of agricultural products leads to information asymmetry,and the premium brought by local characteristics and brand identifications is easy to induce producers and operators to make up the origin,steal the brand and other false claims behaviors,causing huge economic losses to consumers.As a result,the trust and recognition of regional brand agricultural products decline,leading to the sales difficulties and even slow sales of regional brand agricultural products.On the other hand,the negative effects brought by the public nature of regional brands such as free riding and tragedy of public land seriously restrict the development of local regional brand agricultural products enterprises,and thus become an obstacle on the road of rural revitalization.Therefore,how to maintain the construction of regional brand of agricultural products and effectively restrict the false claims behavior of agricultural products enterprises has become the focus of social and academic attention.Practice and research show that the lack of effective supervision is the main reason for the existence of false claims behavior of agricultural products enterprises.At present,the supervision of false claims of agricultural products involves many departments,and it is difficult for all departments to conduct unified coordination and organization.Moreover,false claims of agricultural products enterprises is difficult to be effectively restrained only by the single external supervision force of the government or other regulatory departments because of its characteristics of secrecy and decentralization.Therefore,under the background of promoting agriculture with national quality,strengthening agriculture with brand and realizing rural revitalization,facing the false claims behaviors of some ordinary agricultural products enterprises,how to promote honest operation of ordinary agricultural products enterprises through effective supervision or other measures so as to reduce or even eliminate false claims behaviors is a common concern of relevant departments and scholars.The main research work of this thesis is as follows.(1)Using the signal game research method,based on the supervision of false claims behavior and consumers’ doubt and verification behavior,the signal game model of claims strategy between agricultural products enterprises and consumers is constructed.To explore the influence of the intensity of supervision on the propaganda strategy of agricultural products enterprises;Analyze the optimal purchasing decision of consumers and the deceptive decision of agricultural products enterprises;Study the changes of consumer surplus and social welfare under different regulatory efforts.It is found that only relying on a single external regulatory force can not effectively reduce the false claims behavior of agricultural products enterprises.Relatively strict regulation will aggravate the deception of false claims,while low regulatory effectiveness makes it difficult for the market to achieve the ideal separation equilibrium.Therefore,regional brand agricultural products enterprises take the initiative to adopt strategies,using their own advantages of agricultural products to effectively separate from the market,in order to curb false claims.(2)Based on the failure of single external supervision on false claims,a signal game model of worry-free return and exchange service strategy between agricultural products enterprises and consumers is constructed,two basic equilibrium conditions of signal game model are obtained,and the influence of false claims deception and quality difference on the strategy choice of agricultural products enterprises is analyzed.Study the practical application conditions of the worry-free return and exchange service strategy of regional brand agricultural products enterprises.The research shows that when the quality difference of agricultural products is significant,regional brand agricultural products enterprises can be separated from the market through the worry-free return service strategy.However,when the significant difference of the quality of agricultural products is low,ordinary agricultural products enterprises can imitate by improving the deception,and the signal of worry-free return and exchange service strategy is "out of order",which cannot effectively restrict the false claims behavior of ordinary agricultural products.(3)Aiming at the problem of "failure" of worry-free return and exchange signals caused by insignificant quality difference of agricultural products,two coping strategies of consumer interaction platform and blockchain technology application were proposed,and the implementation conditions and optimal strategy selection of different strategies were studied combined with the actual situation.The research shows that when the information of evaluation is large enough,regional brand agricultural products enterprises can apply the strategy of consumer interaction platform to restrict the imitation behavior of common agricultural products enterprises.Therefore,regional brand agricultural products enterprises should encourage consumers to evaluate and communicate,and improve the participation enthusiasm of consumers.When the cost of blockchain is relatively small,the government or other regulatory authorities can provide appropriate subsidies to encourage regional branded agricultural enterprises to apply blockchain technology.(4)Based on the game analysis of response strategies of regional brand agricultural products enterprises considering false propaganda,and according to the actual production of agricultural products in our country,we put forward two countermeasures and suggestions to effectively curb the false propaganda behavior of agricultural products enterprises.Strategy 1: The government and relevant departments improve the regional brand certification system of agricultural products,strengthen the qualification examination of regional brands,carry out qualification verification regularly,improve the effectiveness of supervision,and increase penalties on the basis of effective supervision,increase the cost of disguising and reduce the motivation of false claims of ordinary agricultural products enterprises from the source;Strategy 2: Regional brand agricultural products enterprises adopt such proactive coping strategies as worry free return and exchange service and consumer interaction platform,strictly control the quality and safety of each production link,improve the quality of regional brand agricultural products,and effectively curb false claims of common agricultural products enterprises based on the quality characteristics of their own agricultural products.This thesis enriched the theoretical research on countermeasures to effectively restrict the false claims behavior of agricultural products,enriched the application of signal game in the field of signal transmission of agricultural products quality,and provided countermeasures and suggestions for regional brand agricultural products enterprises to effectively deal with false claims behavior. |
