The Study On Game-Playing Dilemmas And Countermeasures In Constructing Regional Brand Of Agricultural Products

Regional brand of agricultural products is a kind of club product and the public brands of agricultural products shared by the whole municipal area are more prone to abuse, as a result, the larger county of agricultural producing and marketing suffers greater losses once "Brand Implicating" Issue takes place. In order to avoid inflicting Brand Implicating and suffering greater losses, rational brand actors have committed to the construction of small brands, which has brought about, on the other hand, the irrational consequence, that is,"Multi-Brands of One Product" Phenomenon. The resource property right is an organism composed of public rights, private rights and part rights, and regional brand resource of agricultural products has dual attributes of public resource and part resource. Widespread in China’s regional brand building of agricultural products, the "Multi-Brands of One Product" Phenomenon and "Brand Implicating" Issue are market manifestations in the form of "Tragedy of Fiefs" exiting in brand resource of agricultural products, comprehensive results of interests game played by regional brand builders of agricultural products. Therefore, the cardinal contradiction and principal crux of the problem in the constructing regional brand of agricultural products is that the strong have weak willing and the weak have strong demand. Based on the summary of research achievements with regard to regional brands of agricultural products by the academic community, taking Jiangxi Gannan Navel Orange brand building as a typical case, the thesis has studied tragedy of the commons, tragedy of fiefs and brand depletion phenomenon in regional brand building of agricultural products; taking county governments as regional brand builders of agricultural products, the thesis has constructed Pure Strategy and Mixed Strategy game models to analyze the game-playing relationship in the regional branding process of agricultural products and concluded that the county government whether to invest in public brand shared by the whole municipal area (or hitchhiking) depends on the comparison of net profit in joint investment and hitchhiking income, as well as net income in independent investment (or free-rider gains), and is influenced by such factors as net relative returns in investment, risk income variation; and then effective strategies to get rid of the game-playing plight in regional brand building of agricultural products are proposed, that is, municipal government moderate intervention to get out of the prisoner’s Dilemma, implementation of multi-brand strategy to get rid of group inefficiency, improving the efficiency of incentive to solve the problem of "Boxed Pigs", and strengthening supervision to reduce systemic risk.