Research On Reverse Auction Mechanism Of PPP Projects Under Asymmetric Cost Information

Infrastructure projects play an important role in China’s economic growth,social development and improvement of residents’ welfare.At present,the construction of infrastructure in China faces the problems of large cost investment and low efficiency,and the introduction of PPP model can effectively solve the above problems.For the bidding of PPP projects,it is a hot topic for the government to choose the right company as the government partner without knowing the ability of the company to operate the project,so the research in this paper is of certain importance for PPP projects.On the other hand,the government considers that PPP projects have the risk of losing money when the actual road demand is not as expected during the operation period,so the government needs to give the enterprises appropriate government compensation,including the government compensation mode and compensation level.For enterprises,they need to balance the relationship between the probability of winning the bid and enterprise profit in the reverse auction of PPP projects.Based on this,this paper takes highway as the specific research object of infrastructure projects,takes uncertainty of highway demand as the background,and studies the problem of reverse auction mechanism of PPP projects under cost information asymmetry by constructing a mathematical model and combining the mathematical model with real-life cases under the situation that enterprises are at cost information advantage and governments are at cost information disadvantage.It is found that(1)government compensation mechanisms such as government subsidies,minimum demand guarantee and revenue guarantee as bidding decision variables can all achieve the purpose of winning bids for the lowest cost type enterprises;(2)government compensation mechanisms such as government subsidies,minimum demand guarantee and revenue guarantee are all revenue equivalent,but the equilibrium bidding strategies of enterprises will differ;(3)different prevailing price pricing methods will affect social welfare as well as corporate profits,with social welfare in direct pricing being greater than that in indirect pricing mode,while corporate profits are the opposite.(4)The profits obtained by enterprises in PPP projects are information rents,which are related to enterprise costs,but not to government compensation models.(5)Corporate profit is also related to the number of enterprises participating in the bidding,and the government can reduce the position of enterprises in the information advantage by attracting more enterprises to participate in the bidding of PPP projects.